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The right to a fair trial is fundamental to American jurisprudence. The 
Fifth Amendment of the Bill of Rights guarantees “due process,” while 
the Sixth provides the accused with the right to be “confronted with the 
witnesses against him.” But “time works changes, brings into existence 
new conditions and purposes.” So it is with software. From the 
smartphones we access multiple times a day to more exotic tools—the 
software “genies” of Amazon Echo and Google Home—software is 
increasingly embedded in day-to-day life. It does glorious things, such 
as flying planes and creating CAT scans, but it also has problems: 
software errors.  
 
Software has also found its way into trials. Software’s errors have 
meant that defendants are often denied their fundamental rights. In this 
Article, we focus on “evidentiary software”—computer software used 
for producing evidence—that is routinely introduced in modern 
courtrooms. Whether from breathalyzers, computer forensic analysis, 
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trial evidence. Yet despite the central role software plays in convictions, 
computer code is often unavailable to examination by the defense. This 
may be for proprietary reasons—the vendor wishes to protect its 
confidential software—or it may result from a decision by the 
government to withhold the code for security reasons. Because 
computer software is far from infallible—software programs can create 
incorrect information, erase details, vary data depending on when and 
how they are accessed—or fail in a myriad of other ways—the only way 
that the accused can properly and fully defend himself is to have an 
ability to access the software that produced the evidence. Yet often the 
defendants are denied such critical access.  
 
In this Article, we do an in-depth examination of the problem. Then, 
providing a variety of examples of software failure and discussing the 
limitations of technologists’ ability to prove software programs correct, 
we suggest potential processes for disclosing software that enable fair 
trials while nonetheless preventing wide release of the code. 
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I. Introduction  
 
The right to a fair trial is fundamental to a democracy. In the United 
States, this right is guaranteed pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, which 
ensures “due process,”5 and the Sixth Amendment, which provides the 
accused with the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him.”6 These legal rights are a hallmark of the judicial process in the 





5 U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
6 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
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right to a fair trial. The problem arises from the change in what 
constitutes a witness. At the time the Bill of Rights was written, 
witnesses were people, and it was well understood what it meant “to be 
confronted with the witness.”7 But times have changed. 
 
Today we use complex software tools to measure certain types of 
activity, such as the level of blood alcohol a person has or how fast a car 
is being driven. We then use the results produced by these tools to 
provide evidence in court. The Federal Rules of Evidence enable 
defendants to question expert witnesses who present testimony on the 
validity of the evidence.8 However, these protections do not extend to 
“questioning” computer code. Through three largely unrelated 
developments, these essential protections are in danger of being sharply 
curtailed, and therein lies a serious problem. 
 
The first of the developments is the rise of “evidentiary software,” that 
is, software whose output is itself evidence.9 This has happened despite 
the prevalence of errors in large software systems, a concern well known 
to the computer science community but much less so to the public. The 
ubiquity of software errors is the second issue, since citizens may be 
convicted on the basis of what amounts to a witness bearing false 
testimony. The third arises from the increase of proprietary software; 
that and bureaucratic opacity have made it difficult for defendants to 
examine this software.10 The result is a miscarriage of justice: 
conviction as a result of evidence that the defendants are not able to 
cross-examine and which, in fact, may be in error. Lest we lose the 
protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, here we examine the 





7 Interactive Constitution, Sixth Amendment: Right to Speedy Trial by Jury, Witnesses, 
Counsel, NAT’L CONST. CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-
constitution/amendment/amendment-vi [https://perma.cc/LAS7-2HPZ]. 
8 FED. R. EVID. 702.  
9 While there are many examples, the simplest is the breathalyzer: complex software analyzes 
the breath sample for its alcohol content. See, e.g., SEAN E. GOODISON ET AL., RAND 
CORPORATION, DIGITAL EVIDENCE AND THE U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: IDENTIFYING 
TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER NEEDS TO MORE EFFECTIVELY ACQUIRE AND UTILIZE DIGITAL 
EVIDENCE (2015), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248770.pdf. 
10 See generally Stephen W. Smith, Policing Hoover’s Ghost: The Privilege for Law 
Enforcement Techniques, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 233 (2017).  




Others have discussed concerns about proprietary code11 and the 
inability of defendants in civil and criminal cases to access the full 
evidence against them. While our fundamental concern is about fairness 
and upholding the rights pursuant to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, 
our focus is somewhat different. We are concerned that the evidence is 
inaccurate—and because the defendants cannot access the underlying 
code, there is no way for the defendants to discover the falsehood of the 
“evidence” against them. What this means is that, although case law has 
moved to enable a defendant to cross-examine one who bears witness 
against him, the failure of the courts to understand the vagaries of 
evidentiary software and the great chance of errors in the evidence 
means that the right often fails in practice. 
 
We will start our explanation of these issues with a simple example: the 
Breathalyzer.12 The scientific principle behind these devices is 
straightforward: when someone drinks, alcohol is not digested, but is 
simply absorbed into the bloodstream where it does not undergo any 
chemical changes. When alcohol-laden blood reaches the lungs, the 
alcohol diffuses into the lungs proportionally to the amount in the blood. 
Thus, alcohol in exhaled breath provides a way to measure the level of 





11 See generally Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the 
Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (2018).  
12 “Breathalyzer” is a live trademark, serial number 72028025. That said, the word is often 
used generically; see, e.g., Kashmir Hill, Imagine Being on Trial. With Exonerating Evidence 
Trapped on Your Phone., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/22/business/law-enforcement-public-defender-technology-
gap.html [https://perma.cc/4TK5-9L8K] (“Law enforcement agencies get a new investigative 
technique — fingerprinting, DNA analysis, breathalyzer tests — and those representing the 
accused struggle to play catch-up.”).  
13 Certain situations can change the validity of the reading, including whether the person being 
tested is diabetic or has been fasting—this may produce acetone, which is measured as 
alcohol—or whether they have recently used a mouth freshener, which may contain alcohol. 
Dentures can also trap alcohol in the mouth. See MURDO BLACK, 
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The explanation that follows is taken from the Breathalyzer’s14 inventor, 
Robert Borkenstein, once a member of the Indiana State Police and later 
a professor of forensic studies at Indiana University. The device shuttles 
a person’s breath down a tube, eliminating the first portion of the breath. 
The breath is then combined with a mixture of sulfuric acid, potassium 
dichromate, silver nitrate, and water. The silver nitrate acts as a catalyst 
to speed up the chemical reaction transforming alcohol, potassium 
dichromate, and sulfuric acid into potassium sulfate, chromium sulfate, 
acetic acid, and water. The potassium dichromate and potassium sulfate 
are the chemicals to observe. Potassium dichromate is reddish-orange, 
while potassium sulfate is green. A photocell measures the decrease in 
yellow light, thus revealing the amount of alcohol present in the 




Diagram taken from How Stuff Works.16 
 
Although this chemistry is simple, chemistry itself is messy; it is much 
easier if one can dispense with “wet” devices. The development of 
infrared instruments for testing breath alcohol levels did so. The 





14 “Breathalyzer” refers to Borkenstein’s invention. When used with a small “b,” the word 
denotes devices that chemically ascertain breath-alcohol levels from a person’s breath. See 
A.W. Jones, Physiological Aspects of Breath-Alcohol Measurement, 6 ALCOHOL, DRUGS & 
DRIVING 1, 2 (Apr.-June 1990).  
15 R.F. Borkenstein & H.W. Smith, The Breathalyzer and Its Applications, 2 MED., SCI. & L., 
13, 14 (1961).  
16 Craig Freudenrich, How Breathalyzers Work, HOW STUFF WORKS (Oct. 20, 2000), 
https://electronics.howstuffworks.com/gadgets/automotive/breathalyzer.htm 
[https://perma.cc/4KWT-DS27].  




Molecules absorb electromagnetic radiation at certain 
specific, unique wavelengths. Thus, it may be said that 
each molecule has its own ‘infrared fingerprint.’ Ethyl 
alcohol absorbs radiation at wavelengths of 
approximately 3.00, 3.39, 7.25, 9.18, 9.50, and 11.5 
microns. No other compound absorbs radiation at all of 
those wave-lengths exclusively.17  
 
Infrared and fuel-cell breathalyzers, which measure the current through 
the breath, are the most common types of breathalyzers.18  
 
In order to accept the results of a breath-testing device, the judge and 
jury need to answer two questions: How does the device work? Does 
the device report alcohol breath levels accurately? The Breathalyzer was 
preceded by a simpler tool, the Drunkometer,19 that operated on the 
same principles, and in 1955 Edwin Conrad, a senior attorney at the 
Federal Communications Commission, looked at how well evidence 
from various tools—radar guns, lie detectors, and Drunkometers—was 
being accepted by the courts.20 He concluded that “scientific 
instrumentality of proof will not be accepted in evidence unless it has 
gained sufficient standing and scientific recognition, and has been 
demonstrated to be dependable.”21 Accepting the evidence required that 
it be:  
 
proved that qualified chemists made the test; the 
underlying theory and operation of the Drunkometer be 
explained in great detail; the accuracy of the machine in 





17 AM. PROSECUTORS RSCH INST., BREATH TESTING FOR PROSECUTORS: TARGETING HARDCORE 
IMPAIRED DRIVERS 11 (2004), https://cdn.ymaws.com/mcaa-
mn.org/resource/resmgr/files/tsrp/Resources/Breath_Testing_for_Prosecuto.pdf. 
18 3 Types of Breathalyzers, ELAWTALK, https://elawtalk.com/types-of-breathalyzers/ 
[https://perma.cc/AKT9-SY3L].  
19 Barron Lerner, How Police Nab Drunk Drivers: From Drunkometer to Breathalyzer, 
WBUR (Dec. 31, 2012), http://hereandnow.legacy.wbur.org/2012/12/31/breathalyzer-history 
[https://perma.cc/DAR6-LQLM].  
20 Edwin Conrad, Push-Button Evidence, 41 VA. L. REV. 217, 218 (1955).  
21 Id. at 219.  
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were outlined by eminently qualified experts, and finally, 
the results of the test were interpreted medically.22 
 
What constitutes such scientific “recognition”? The Federal Rules of 
Evidence Rule 702 on Testimony by Expert Witnesses states: 
 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise if: 
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue; 
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
methods; and 
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and 
methods to the facts of the case.23 
 
Pursuant to 1993 Daubert v. Merill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the trial 
judge must determine “whether the testimony's underlying reasoning or 
methodology is scientifically valid and properly can be applied to the 
facts at issue.”24 In other words, the trial judge is the gatekeeper of 
scientific evidence determining what is admitted and what is excluded. 
It is important to note the role breathalyzers play in cases involving 
driving under the influence (“DUI”) cases. Blood-alcohol concentration 
is what matters in American DUI cases, and thus, the breathalyzer 
measurements are critical.25  
 
For breathalyzers, accuracy is determined by state and federal testing. 
The Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act of 199126 requires 





22 Id. at 228.  
23 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
24 509 U.S. 579, 580 (1993). 
25 Christopher Combs, The Truth About Blood Alcohol Level & the Breathalyzer, COMBS L. 
GRP. (June 3, 2018), https://www.combslawstl.com/blog/2018/06/03/the-truth-about-blood-
alcohol-level-the-breathalyzer/ [https://perma.cc/BJ94-WZ3T].  
26 Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Act, Pub. L. No. 102-43, 105 Stat. 917, 
953 (1992).  
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so on—be subject to alcohol testing programs, and the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHSTA”) tests “evidential 
breath testers” on a regular basis27 and publishes a “Conforming 
Products List of Evidential Breath Measurement Devices.”28 While 
states are not required to follow the federal list of approved devices, 
NHSTA provides funds to purchase approved devices, and thus many 
states adhere to the NHSTA list.29 The devices’ accuracy became 
trusted, and that trust lasted through several decades of cases.30 
 
But there was always pressure against this trust. DUI cases form a 
peculiar subset of court cases; like jaywalking, cheating on income 
taxes, and failing to fully separate recyclable goods from trash, DUI is 
committed relatively frequently by people who are not considered 
criminals in the usual sense of the word. Yet the consequence of a DUI 
conviction—it may result in incarceration or the loss of a driver’s 
license—can be high.31 Accordingly, many drivers “lawyer up” when 
facing a potential DUI conviction. Legal attacks on breathalyzers’ 






27 Highway Safety Programs; Model Specifications for Devices to Measure Breath Alcohol, 
58 Fed. Reg. 48705 (Sept. 17, 1993).  
28 See, e.g., Highway Safety Programs; Conforming Products List of Evidential Breath 
Alcohol Measurement Devices, 77 Fed. Reg. 35747 (June 14, 2012). 
29 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-477, TRAFFIC SAFETY: IMPROVED REPORTING 
AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES WOULD ENHANCE PERFORMANCE OF HIGH-VISIBILITY 
CAMPAIGNS (2008).  
30 As an example, in 2008 the New Jersey Supreme Court wrote that “[t]he accuracy and 
reliability of the breathalyzer itself has remained essentially unquestioned since our decision in 
Romano v. Kimmelman, 96 N.J. 66, 474 A.2d 1 (1984).” State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 120 
(N.J. 2008).  
31 With public transportation being minimal or even non-existent in many parts of the United 
States, loss of a driver’s license can have a secondary, very severe penalty: loss of a job. See 
Alana Semuels, No Driver’s License, No Job, ATLANTIC (June 15, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/06/no-drivers-license-no-job/486653/ 
[https://perma.cc/QEN6-C5E7]; Dana DiFillippo, The Poverty Penalty: 
Should States Suspend Driver’s Licenses for Scofflaws, WHYY (Nov. 27, 2017), 
https://whyy.org/articles/poverty-penalty-states-suspend-drivers-licenses-court-scofflaws/ 
[https://perma.cc/2UKH-X5C3]. 
32 See generally Ronald MacGregor, Breathalyzers: Defects Then/Failures Still, HG.ORG, 
https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/breathalyzers-defects-then-failures-still-30878 
[https://perma.cc/L684-SUVE].  
2021]  9 
 
 
Modern devices all depend on software, but software unfortunately 
introduces new and potentially hidden failure modes into the 
technology. DUI convictions are per se violations based on breathalyzer 
results—a rating over .08 blood-alcohol level means the person is 
legally drunk33—making device accuracy critical. However, many of 
state testing labs were limited in their capabilities; the labs could only 
do “black box” testing, providing input to a breathalyzer and seeing the 
output, and not directly examining the software. Indeed, in many cases, 
even state lab testers lacked access to the code. In cases from Florida,34 
to Minnesota,35 to New Jersey,36 to Massachusetts, courts have said the 
denial of access to such source code37 in criminal prosecution violates 
due process and the Confrontation Clause.38 Thus, examinations of the 
software have started, and software in breathalyzers has been found to 
have errors.39  
 
One important one was the 2008 New Jersey case of State v. Chun, a 
consolidation of twenty cases of individuals charged with DWI.40 The 
counsel obtained the source code for the Alcotest 7110 MKIII-C 
breathalyzer.41 The device works by using both infrared (“IR”) and 
electrical chemical (“EC”) oxidation technology to measure breath-
alcohol levels.42 Subjects are typically tested twice, for a total of four 





33 DUI Offense Basics, FINDLAW, https://dui.findlaw.com/dui-charges/dui-offense-basics.html 
[https://perma.cc/F74G-G87S] (last updated Oct. 24, 2018). 
34 See generally State v. Allen, No. 08-CT-8840, slip op. at 2-3 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Apr. 24, 2009) 
(unpublished); State v. Atkins, No. 48-2008-CT-673-E, slip op. at 8-9 (Fla. Orange Cnty. Ct. 
June 20, 2008) (unpublished); State v. Lance Conley, No. 48-2012-CT-000017-A/A (Fla. Cir. 
Ct. Sept. 22, 2014). 
35 State v. Underdahl, 749 N.W.2d 117, 122-23 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008).  
36 Chun, 943 A.2d at 170. 
37 “Source code” is explained below. See infra Section II. 
38 Thomas E. Workman Jr., Massachusetts Breath Testing for Alcohol: A Computer Science 
Perspective, 8 J. HIGH TECH. L. 209, 232 (2008); see also Chun, 943 A.2d at 128-31. 
39 Stacy Cowley & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, These Machines Can Put You in Jail. Don’t 
Trust Them., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2019) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/06/nyregion/crash-five-dead-long-island.html 
[https://perma.cc/K8PP-LV42].  
40 943 A.2d. at 121.  
41 Evan Levow, Summary of the Software House Finding for the Source Code of the Draeger 
Alcotest 7110 MKIII-C, DWI.COM, https://www.dwi.com/new-jersey/state-v-chun/ 
[https://perma.cc/URH9-94KC].  
42 Chun, 943 A.2d. at 128.  
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second breath.43 The measurements from the first breath are compared 
to the measurements from the second breath; if the measurements from 
the first breath are not within accepted levels of tolerance of the second 
breath, then the machine operator requires the subject to take a third 
breath; this will again provide two readings.44  
 
The outside examiners noted that, “[w]hen the software takes a series of 
readings, it first averages the first two readings. Then, it averages the 
third reading with the average just computed. Then the fourth reading is 
averaged with the new average, and so on.”45 (Mathematically, that is 
not an average, as it weighs the first reading significantly more than the 
others, the second less than the first, but more than the others, etc.) The 
examiners were concerned that the error detection logic of the device 
needed a measurement error to register thirty-two times in a row for an 
error message to be displayed; otherwise the error was ignored.46  
 
The court’s special master deemed the device to be scientifically 
reliable,47 but the court itself did not.48 The New Jersey Supreme Court 
was not bothered by the way the device computed the so-called average, 
instead pointing out that what this did was give higher weight to the 
portion of the breath from the deepest air in the lung, the portion that 
most accurately reflects blood-alcohol levels.49 But the court observed 
an error occurred when one of the original four readings fell outside 
accepted tolerance of the device.50 In such a case, the subject is asked to 





43 Jeffrey Lustick, Getting to Know Washington’s New DUI Breathalyzer: The German Made 




45 Levow, supra note 41.  
46 Id.  
47 Chun, 943 A.2d. at 153; STEPHEN P. SMITH ET AL., IIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INDEPENDENT 
REVIEW OF THE CARNIVORE SYSTEM, FINAL 
REPORT xiii (2000), https://www.epic.org/privacy/carnivore/carniv_final.pdf.  
48 Chun, 943 A.2d. at 153.  
49 Id. at 156-57. 
50 Id. at 157-58.  
51 According to the court, as many as 5% of defendants might be tested on a third breath. Id. at 
157.  
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breath—are included in its calculation (or at least, they should be). As 
the New Jersey Supreme Court discovered, this did not happen.  
 
If the second EC reading was low—indicating the subject had low 
blood-alcohol levels—that evidence was simply ignored by the system. 
This was not because of malfeasance, but because of a programming 
error “due to [a] buffer overflow error”—an overwriting of the data.52 
Buffer overflow errors been known academically since 198153 (and in 
practice since 198854). If the defense had an opportunity to examine the 
code, this error might have been found, in which case the evidence 
would have been dismissed. 
 
That such an error should occur in a breathalyzer marketed in 2008 is 
both astonishing and highly disturbing. Avoiding such errors is always 
taught in first semester programming classes;55 the existence of such an 
error demonstrates a serious lack of quality control by the vendor. An 
adversarial audit may have found the problem; without both source code 
and a suitable test environment (itself hard to construct without source 
code), there would be no way to find it. 
 
The outside examiners found “thousands of programming errors” upon 
testing the Alcotest 7110 MKIII-C.56 Drager, the manufacturer, claimed 
to have fixed the problems, but in 2019 the New York Times reported 






52 Id. at 157-59. 
53 See C.A.R. Hoare, The Emperor's Old Clothes, 24 COMMC’NS ACM 75, 76-77 (1981).  
54 Jon A. Rochlis & Mark W. Eichin, With Microscope and Tweezers: The Worm from MIT’s 
Perspective, 32 COMMC’NS ACM 689, 689 (1989).  
55 Buffer overflows are typically caused by lack of bounds-checking on what are known as 
“array indices.” Improper indices are always wrong; using them can cause program crashes, 
erroneous results, or security problems. Consequently, all introductory classes and texts stress 
this point. See, e.g., ROBERT SEDGEWICK & KEVIN WAYNE, INTRODUCTION TO PROGRAMMING 
IN JAVA: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH §1.4 (2d ed., 2017) (“When programming with 
arrays, you must be careful. It is your responsibility to use legal indices when accessing an 
array element.”).  
56 Cowley & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 39.  
57 Id.  
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Programming errors such as these are not limited to breathalyzers. A 
particularly striking example comes from Carnivore,58 an FBI program 
for analyzing network traffic—this is called a packet sniffer—that was 
developed in the late 1990s and used on ISP’s networks. Using filters to 
record traffic fitting some predetermined pattern, such as all email to or 
from a particular target, Carnivore would collect traffic pursuant to a 
pen/trap order or wiretap warrant.59  
 
The software program was not properly designed, however, enabling 
incorrect collection of communications traffic. In 2000, an outside 
review committee discovered that, “Incorrectly configured, Carnivore 
can record any traffic it monitors.”60 The ability to record “any traffic” 
should not have been possible. In addition, the system permitted 
additional copies of intercepts to be made, even if they had not been 
minimized (a requirement for all lawful wiretaps); only FBI “procedures 
and professionalism” prevented that from occurring.61  
 
One might imagine that the concerns the oversight committee raised 
were theoretical worries; surely the device would not actually exhibit 
such flaws in practice. In fact, serious problems occurred in the 
collection. An FBI anti-terrorism investigation by the team focusing on 
Osama bin Laden used Carnivore.62 According to an internal memo, 
“[t]he FBI software not only picked up the E-mails under the electronic 
surveillance of the FBI’s target XXX but also picked up E-mails on non-
covered targets. The FBI technical person was apparently so upset that 





58 Carnivore was later renamed DCS-1000, for Digital Collection Service 1000. DCS-3000 is 
the FBI’s New Carnivore, WIRED (Apr. 27, 2006, 7:04 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/2006/04/dcs3000-is-the-/ [https://perma.cc/U6VQ-EUCH].  
59 SMITH ET AL., supra note 47. 
60 Id. at xii. 
61 Id. at 4.2-4.3.  
62 The unit was known as the “UBL” unit; they spelled the target’s name “Usama bin Laden.” 
Michele Zanini & Sean J.A. Edwards, The Networking of Terror in the Information Age, in 
NETWORKS AND NETWARS: THE FUTURE OF TERROR, CRIME, AND MILITANCY, 39 (1999), 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1382/MR1382.ch2.pdf. 
63 Memorandum from the FBI on FISA Mistakes to Spike Bowman (April 5, 2000) (on file 
with Electronic Privacy Information Center) https://www.epic.org/privacy/carnivore/fisa.html 
[https://perma.cc/6FND-CHYV]. Context is given in the EPIC press release. See Press 
Release, Electronic Privacy Information Center, FBI’s Carnivore System Disrupted Anti-




Carnivore was collecting digital evidence, which makes the fact that the 
Carnivore software was improperly designed particularly disturbing. 
Breathalyzers test a physical object—a human breath. While it is not 
standard to preserve the actual breath sample, it is possible to require 
that such samples be preserved until court hearings have occurred; in 
fact, the states of Alaska and New Hampshire do exactly that.64 
However, the digital artifacts that Carnivore collected were the actual 
evidence itself. One aspect of the Carnivore evidence collection 
process—overcollection—had gone wrong, but so could other aspects 
of collection. This raises the possibility that the collected evidence as 
seen by the court could be incorrect or it could appear misleadingly out 
of context. This makes clear that the ability of the defendant to cross-
examine the “witnesses”—in this case, the digital code that did the 
collection—is crucial.  
 
Computer forensic analysis provides yet a third example of problems 
with evidentiary software. Apple forensics expert Jonathan Zdziarski 
was hired by the United States Army to examine phone evidence in the 
case of a brigadier general who had been accused of sexual harassment, 






Terror Investigation (May 28, 2002) (on file with author) 
https://www.epic.org/privacy/carnivore/5_02_release.html [https://perma.cc/QM3T-KYBF]. 
64 Best v. Mun. of Anchorage, 712 P.2d 892, 898–99 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); Mun. of 
Anchorage v. Serrano 649 P.2d 256 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (state must preserve a breath 
sample). Current New Hampshire law requires the collection and preservation of an additional 
blood sample, and that someone who is asked to perform a breath test shall be informed that 
they have the right, at their own expense, to have a blood sample drawn and preserved. See In 
re Op. of Justices (Eliminating Requirements for Additional Breath Samples), 2 A.3d 1102 
(N.H. 2010) (New Hampshire Supreme Court rejected proposed amendment to eliminate the 
requirement to save two breath samples). Other states have a duty to preserve, but it is not 
constitutionally mandated. Arizona has a duty to preserve breath samples for independent 
testing pursuant to its implied consent law. See RSA 265-A:7 II and III; State v. Vannoy, 866 
P.2d 874, 878 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (discussing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-691). Failure to 
preserve breath samples did not violate due process or equal protection. See also People v. 
Molina, 468 N.Y.S.2d 551, 558 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1983) (“basic fairness and the duty to make of 
the trial a search for truth informed by all relevant material requires that the police preserve for 
the defendant's use a separate breath sample for testing and analysis”); People v. Trombetta, 
219 Cal. Rptr. 637 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). 
65 SUSAN LANDAU, LISTENING IN: CYBERSECURITY IN AN INSECURE AGE 145 (2017) (ebook). 
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Zdziarski was brought into the case late, just before the trial was to start. 
In the course of examining the phone, Zdziarski determined that the 
computer forensic tools initially used in the investigation did not work 
correctly. Timeline was a crucial issue in the case, and so Zdziarski 
needed to look at timestamps for device erasures, backup restores, and 
file accesses. The commercial forensic tools had reported these 
inaccurately. Problems included incorrect times for app deletion, basing 
the time on when the phone was next booted up rather than when the 
app was actually removed.66 This meant that the forensic tools were 
miscalculating when the app was actually used. Zdziarski’s analysis 
changed the case, with the Army dropping the most serious charges.67 
 
Breathalyzers, packet sniffers and wiretaps, and computer forensic tools 
are far from the only examples of evidentiary software. Indeed, the 
errors we have discussed present but the tip of an iceberg. Other 
instances include radar guns, tools for conducting DNA analysis, and 
network investigative techniques (the last is government malware used, 
pursuant to court order, to intrude onto a system in order to investigate 
and/or obtain evidence).68 Moreover, with our drive willy-nilly into the 
Digital Revolution, we are moving into a world in which law 
enforcement will increasingly rely on evidentiary software. From 
automatic toll booths that register when a car enters and exits a highway 
to personal devices that record where and when an individual is, the 
percentage of cases that rely on evidentiary software is increasing. The 
fact that such software may incorrectly report its findings makes cross-
examining source code crucial to the basic protections laid down in the 
Bill of Rights.  
 
Yet that capability, so necessary for protecting a defendant’s rights, is 
disappearing. Even as we rely on computer software to bear witness, we 





66 Jonathan Zdziarski, An Example of Forensic Science at Its Worst: US v. Brig. Gen. Jeffrey 
Sinclair, ZDZIARSKI’S BLOG OF THINGS (Aug. 24, 2014), 
https://www.zdziarski.com/blog/?p=3717 [https://perma.cc/PR75-FW6A]. 
67 LANDAU, supra note 65. 
68 See, e.g., Jennifer Stisa Granic, Challenging Government Hacking: What’s at 
Stake, ACLU (Nov. 2, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-
technology/internet-privacy/challenging-government-hacking-whats-stake 
[https://perma.cc/T6HC-FZ27]. 
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enforcement privilege”69 frequently prevents access to the details of 
investigative techniques and procedures.  
 
Given the guarantees of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, it may be 
difficult to understand how prosecutors are able to withhold details of 
the tools used in evidence gathering. This approach is a relatively new 
phenomenon.70 Recently, United States Magistrate Judge Stephen 
Smith presented a compelling history of the law enforcement privilege’s 
genesis.71 The change began with the 1950 espionage trial of Judith 
Coplon, a Department of Justice employee in the Foreign Agents 
Registration Division.72 Coplon was also a Soviet spy. The FBI had 
become suspicious of her and fed her a false document.73 Coplon was 
arrested as she was handing over the fake document—and twenty-eight 
classified memoranda—to her accomplice.74  
 
The twenty-eight other memoranda were a problem for FBI Director J. 
Edgar Hoover, for they showed evidence that the FBI was illegally 
wiretapping.75 In 1937, ruling on the basis of the Federal 
Communications Act,76 the Supreme Court deemed it illegal to 
“intercept” and “divulge” wired communications.77 Initially, the 
Department of Justice interpreted the decision to mean interception and 
divulgence of content outside the federal government was unlawful.78 
In 1940 President Franklin Roosevelt authorized the practice against 
those suspected of subversive activities against the United States 





69 Smith, supra note 10, at 233. 
70 Id. 
71 See generally id. 
72 See generally United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950).  
73 Id. at 632-35. 
74 ATHAN G. THEOHARIS & JOHN STUART COX, THE BOSS: J. EDGAR HOOVER AND THE GREAT 
AMERICAN INQUISITION 256 (1988). 
75 Smith, supra note 10, at 237. 
76 47 U.S.C. § 605. 
77 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 382 (1937). 
78 SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE 
ACTIVITIES, S. REP. NO. 94-755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Book III, at 278 n.25 (letter from 
Attorney General Robert Jackson to Rep. Hatton Summers, March 19, 1941). 
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to a minimum and “limit them insofar as possible to aliens.”79 
Nonetheless, the original restriction of the court still stood. The FBI had 
been wiretapping Coplon; although Hoover sought to conceal that fact 
during Coplon’s trials, her defense attorney was able to get it into the 
record.80 As a result, Coplon’s convictions were overturned.81 The more 
significant result from this was Hoover’s response, which was 
effectively to hide wiretaps from view.82  
 
The wily FBI director did not stop there. As Stephen Smith has detailed, 
Hoover publicly campaigned to establish an “evidentiary privilege 
covering law-enforcement techniques and procedures.”83 Evidentiary 
privilege was a new idea in 1950. However, as we can see from very 
public law-enforcement efforts to keep the techniques of investigative 
technologies hidden,84 it is an oft-used practice.  
 
The FBI director’s efforts are not the only ones pushing in favor of 
evidentiary privilege. Judge Smith details how a small exemption for 
law-enforcement records in the Freedom of Information Act became a 
Mack Truck-sized hole that has permitted the withholding of 
evidentiary information by multiple courts.85  
 
Sometimes legal problems arise from a single issue, as it did in the 
Coplon trial, where the withholding of evidence resulted in an unfair 





79 Id. at 279 (Franklin D. Roosevelt, Confidential Memorandum for the Attorney General, 
May 21, 1940). 
80 See Smith, supra note 10, at 234. 
81 Coplon was tried in the District of Columbia on unauthorized possession of classified 
documents and in the Southern District of New York on espionage. The illegal wiretapping 
formed the basis for an appeal of Coplon’s second trial, which won her a reversal. Smith, 
supra note 11, at 234-37. 
82 Wiretap evidence including requests for taps, etc. would be stored separately from the main 
files of a case, with only a single copy of the wiretap stored. This was held in a secure area at 
FBI headquarters. THEOHARIS & COX, supra note 74, at 259-60. 
83 Smith, supra note 10, at 243. 
84 Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Your Secret Stingray’s No Secret Anymore: The 
Vanishing Government Monopoly over Cell Phone Surveillance and Its Impact on National 
Security and Consumer Privacy, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 33-34 (2014). 
85 Smith, supra note 10, at 248-50. 
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confluence of issues. That is the situation here with the combination of 
evidentiary software, evidentiary privilege, and software error.  
 
The issue of software error occupies a large part of computer science 
research and practice,86 including security (a high percentage of security 
problems are due to buggy code87) and concerns about fairness and 
accuracy in machine learning. Here, we have focused narrowly on how 
the combination of evidentiary software, evidentiary privilege, and 
software error poses a threat to the fundamental right of criminal 
defendants to a fair trial. The good news is that, unlike the larger 
problem of software error, this problem posed by errors in evidentiary 
software appears relatively solvable. While our proposed solution 
challenges the present handling of the situation, our recommendation is 
technically feasible and is without high financial costs.88 
 
We begin in Section II with an explanation of the nature of software and 
thus of coding errors, ending with an explanation of modern techniques 
used to find and correct these problems. In Section III we discuss the 
three Constitutional concerns that are raised by software errors: Brady 
violations (the prosecution must provide exculpatory evidence to a 
defendant),89 the implications of the Confrontation Clause, and the Due 
Process clause. We conclude in Section IV with our recommendations. 
 
II. The Root of the Problem 
 
The essence of our argument is this: the nature of software, and hence 





86 Buggy code has long been a focus for academics and practitioners alike. “First, one must 
perform perfectly. The computer resembles the magic of legend in this respect, too. If one 
character, one pause, of the incantation is not strictly in proper form, the magic doesn't work. 
Human beings are not accustomed to being perfect, and few areas of human activity demand 
it. Adjusting to the requirement for perfection is, I think, the most difficult part of learning to 
program.” FREDERICK P. BROOKS, JR., THE MYTHICAL MAN-MONTH 8 (1975). 
87 See WILLIAM R. CHESWICK & STEVEN M. BELLOVIN, FIREWALLS AND INTERNET SECURITY: 
REPELLING THE WILY HACKER 7 (1994). 
88 It is in fact not clear that there will be a net increase in costs, if early audits reduce the need 
for future litigation. 
89 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
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be found by adversarial testing. We start by giving a brief overview of 
the nature and limitations of software development. 
 
The software design process typically starts with the creation of 
“specifications,” a detailed description of what the system should do.90 
It is not enough to say, for example, “measure breath alcohol level.” 
What are the expected ranges? (A real breath sample will never consist 
of pure ethanol.) How much breath must be sampled? How close should 
it come to the results from an actual blood test? What sort of operational 
errors should be detected? What should the system do if it encounters 
anomalous situations? Should there be internet connectivity, to relay 
results immediately? Should there be a camera and a GPS, for better 
evidentiary value? If so, what if the device is used in a cellular dead 
spot, or if the camera or GPS are not working? How many samples from 
how many drivers must the device store? 
 
Errors can creep in at any point. Unexpectedly high readings might 
erroneously show up as low because the device was never intended to 
handle such values.91 The specification may have omitted important 
details, e.g., what to do if the battery voltage is below a certain level. 
Programmers use the specifications to guide writing the actual 
programs. Testers then use the same specification documents to guide 
their tests. An error in the specifications, then, can turn into erroneous 
code; such errors will not be detected by the testers, since their job is to 
ensure that the program matches the specifications. 
 
Before we explain how coding errors can occur, we provide a brief note 
on terminology. As is widely known, computers “understand” only 0s 
and 1s. That is, the actual computer hardware is only capable of 
understanding “binary”: a way to represent numbers or characters using 





90 See, e.g., Barry W. Boehm, Verifying and Validating Software Requirements and Design 
Specifications, IEEE SOFTWARE, Jan. 1984, at 76. 
91 Extreme values can occur legitimately. For example, in a recent New York criminal case, 
the defendant was described as having “the second highest level of marijuana that they’ve ever 
seen in a living specimen.” Arielle Dollinger, The Stolen Car Was Going 154 M.P.H. Five 
People Ended up Dead., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/06/nyregion/crash-five-dead-long-island.html 
[https://perma.cc/3H9S-3E3S]. 
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being off or on. This is the reason that the actual programs run by a 
computer chip are often referred to as “binaries” or “executables.” 
Programmers, though, almost never directly code actual binary 
programs. Instead, they write in “source code,” a (more-or-less) human-
readable language.92 Specialized programs known as “compilers” 
translate the source code to executables. While it is possible, with proper 
tools and considerable effort, for a human to understand an 
executable—indeed, analysis of computer viruses and other malware 
relies on this ability93—analysis is far easier and far more complete if 
the original source code is available. 
 
A. Computer Programming 
 
It is a truism that computers do only what they are told to do. The 
process of “telling” a computer what to do is called programming, and 
while programming is no longer the rare, arcane art that it once was, 
nevertheless many people have no exposure to it. Then, we explain 
programming errors that cause bugs as well as how programmers test to 
eliminate such bugs. Finally, we address the necessity of adversarial 
audits to safeguard defendants’ rights.  
Consider the following program fragment.94 
 
int a, b;   /* Reserve two storage locations */ 
 
scanf("%d", &a);  /* Read the first value */ 
scanf("%d", &b);  /* Read the second */ 
printf("%d\n", a + b); /* Print their sum */ 
 
It reads into two values and prints their sum. There are several things 






92 Some examples of source code are given. See infra Section II.A. 
93 See generally MICHAEL SIKORSKI & ANDREW HONIG, PRACTICAL MALWARE ANALYSIS: THE 
HANDS-ON GUIDE TO DISSECTING MALICIOUS SOFTWARE (Alison Law et al. eds., 2012). 
94 This fragment is written in a language known as C. See generally BRIAN W. KERNIGHAN & 
DENNIS M. RITCHIE, THE C PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1978). C is the ancestor of many 
currently used programming languages. Neil DuPaul, The History of Programming Languages 
Infographic, VERACODE (Apr. 15, 2013), https://www.veracode.com/blog/2013/04/the-history-
of-programming-languages-infographic [https://perma.cc/ZPR2-HDR5]. 
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The first, of course, is that the code itself—the first portion of each 
line—is completely incomprehensible to anyone but a programmer. The 
second thing to note is that the second half of each line, the portion 
enclosed between /* and */, is readable. These are known as 
“comments” and are ignored by the computer. This particular example 
is artificial, in that not only are there more comments than is customary, 
they’re redundant to the code and would be seen as bad practice. That 
is, a comment like “Print their sum” is rather useless, since to any 
programmer it is apparent that is what the line does.95 A better comment 
is one that explains why the sum is being printed, or what the input 
values mean.96 Nevertheless, even to experienced programmers 
comments can be easier to read than code. 
 
There is another, more subtle point: to a first approximation, every line 
of code interacts with every other. For example, in this case the first line 
says the storage locations “a” and “b” can only hold integers. It is 
straightforward to make them hold numbers with fractional parts, e.g., 
1.5, by writing: 
 
  float a, b; 
 
instead, but that would require certain changes to the corresponding 
scanf line to let it read so-called “floating point” numbers. Furthermore, 













95 Even non-programmers can see the root word “print” and “a + b”. These mean exactly what 




96 Proper commenting style is routinely taught in introductory programming classes. See id. 
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Computers derive much of their power from two features: the ability to 
choose among alternatives and the ability to repeat activities. Suppose 
we wanted to change the above program to subtract two numbers, but 
always to subtract the lesser from the greater: 
 
int a, b;  /* Reserve two storage locations */ 
 
scanf("%d", &a);  /* Read the first value */ 
scanf("%d", &b);  /* Read the second */ 
if (a > b) 
  printf("%d\n", a - b); 
 else 
             printf("%d\n", b - a); 
 
We could also do this repeatedly, for many pairs of numbers: 
 
int a, b;  /* Reserve two storage locations */ 
 
while (1) { 
 scanf("%d", &a); /* Read the first value */ 
 scanf("%d", &b); /* Read the second */ 
 if (a > b) 
  printf("%d\n", a - b); 
 else 
  printf("%d\n", b - a); 
} 
 
We will forbear explaining these program fragments in detail, save to 
note that the last example has a bug: it will run forever, even when there 







97 See generally KERNIGHAN & RITCHIE, supra note 94. There is an old joke about why 
programmers starve to death in the shower: the instructions on shampoo bottles often say 
“Lather, rinse, repeat,” with no instruction on when to stop. Computers, after all, take things 
literally; programmers, perforce, must learn to do the same. Victor Raskin, Verbal Play in 
Computer Jokes, BELB, http://www.belb.info/studenti/mincheva/verbal%20play.htm 
[https://perma.cc/662L-P4LB]. 





Consider the following minor variant of the first programming fragment 
shown above, but where the two storage locations are called “k” and “l” 
instead of “a” and “b”: 
 
int k, l;   /* Reserve two storage locations */ 
 
scanf("%d", &k);  /* Read the first value */ 
scanf("%d", &l);  /* Read the second */ 
printf("%d\n", k + 1); /* Print their sum */ 
 
In fact, the two are not identical; in the second fragment, the sum printed 
is not of the two values, but of the first value, “k”, and the number one.98 
Depending on the font used, the difference between the digit one and 
the 12th letter of the alphabet can be extraordinarily hard to spot. A 
programmer whose eyes see the comment is likely to glance only 
fleetingly at the actual code, and thus not spot the error. Errors—and 
sabotage—from similarly confusing patterns are by no means unknown 
in the real world.99 
 
Simple bugs can have drastic consequences. A missing hyphen 
contributed to the loss of Mariner 1, the first space probe launched 
toward Venus.100 The first launch of the Ariane 5 rocket, after $7 billion 
and a decade of development, failed because of a simple software 
error.101 The first launch of the Space Shuttle Columbia, before a 





98 One of the authors of this article copied and pasted the code fragments above into an actual 
program, to verify that the behavior is as stated. 
99 In what is likely the best-documented sabotage incident, Princeton computer science 
professor Ed Felten described what was an apparent attempt to plant a back door—a deliberate 
security hole known only to its authors—in Linux, relying on just such a trick. Ed Felten, The 
Linux Backdoor Attempt of 2003, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Oct. 9, 2013), https://freedom-to-
tinker.com/2013/10/09/the-linux-backdoor-attempt-of-2003/ [https://perma.cc/5KLY-3J45]. 
100 David R. Williams, Mariner 1, NASA SPACE SCI. DATA COORDINATED ARCHIVE, 
https://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/nmc/spacecraft/display.action?id=MARIN1 
[https://perma.cc/2T5J-PMX2]. 
101 James Gleick, Little Bug, Big Bang, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Dec. 1, 
1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/01/magazine/little-bug-big-bang.html 
[https://perma.cc/4R2K-QGL3]. 
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to a bug.102 Another notable example was a misplaced “break” 
statement103 that led to the failure of most of AT&T’s long distance 
network.104 These bugs were immediately visible. Some bugs, though, 
are silent; one must look (and look hard) for them.105  
 
Bugs are an omnipresent hazard in software. All non-trivial software 
packages have bugs;106 even large-scale efforts to prevent them have 
their limits. Three of us wrote:  
 
[I]t is important to know a fundamental tenet of software 
engineering: bugs happen. In his classic The Mythical 
Man-Month, Frederick Brooks explained why: 
 
First, one must perform perfectly. The 
computer resembles the magic of legend 
in this respect, too. If one character, one 
pause, of the incantation is not strictly in 
proper form, the magic doesn’t work. 





102 John R. Garman, The "BUG" Heard 'Round the World: Discussion of the Software Problem 
Which Delayed the First Shuttle Orbital Flight, 6 ACM SIGSOFT SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 
NOTES, Oct. 1981, at 3. 
103 In computer programs, a fundamental construct is “looping”: repeated execution of a 
segment of code, generally until some condition is met. A “break” statement is one way to 
terminate execution of a loop. See generally KERNIGHAN & RITCHIE, supra note 95. 
104 BRUCE STERLING, THE HACKER CRACKDOWN 35 (1992) (“The ‘break’ was supposed to 
‘break’ the ‘if clause.’ Instead, the ‘break’ broke the ‘switch’ statement.”). 
105 See, e.g., the descriptions of the Juniper and telnet issues, infra Section II.C.  
106 The problem of buggy code has been known since the dawn of computing. STERLING, supra 
note 105 (internal citations omitted). See also Tim Menzies & Thomas Zimmermann, Software 
Analytics: What's Next?, IEEE SOFTWARE, Sept.-Oct. 2018, at 64, 64-65 (“As soon as people 
started programming, it became apparent that programming was an inherently buggy process. 
Maurice Wilkes, speaking of his programming experiences in the early 1950s, recalled the 
following: . . . the realization came over me with full force that a good part of the remainder of 
my life was going to be spent in finding errors in my own programs.”). By the early 1970s, 
researchers had developed formulas to predict the number of bugs in a program, based on its 
size and complexity. Id. at 65; see also Ronald L Rivest, On the Notion of “Software 
Independence” in Voting Systems, 366 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 3759, 3760 
(2008) (“Finding all errors in a large system is generally held to be impossible in general or 
else highly demanding and extremely expensive. Our ability to develop complex software 
vastly exceeds our ability to prove its correctness or test it satisfactorily within reasonable 
fiscal constraints.”). 
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being perfect, and few areas of human 
activity demand it. Adjusting to the 
requirement for perfection is, I think, the 
most difficult part of learning to program.   
 
Because computers, of course, are dumb—they do 
exactly what they are told to do—programming has to be 
absolutely precise and correct. If a computer is told to do 
something stupid, it does it, while a human being would 
notice there is a problem. A person told to walk 50 meters 
then turn left would realize that there was an obstacle 
present, and prefer the path 52 meters down rather than 
walking into a tree trunk. A computer would not, unless 
it had been specifically programmed to check for an 
impediment in its path. If it has not been programmed 
that way—if there is virtually any imperfection in code—
a bug will result. The circumstances which might cause 
that bug to become apparent may be rare, but it would 
nonetheless be a bug.107 
 
Although it may be hard for non-programmers to count individual bugs 
or the result of efforts to prevent them, computer security 







107 Steven M. Bellovin et al., Lawful Hacking: Using Existing Vulnerabilities for Wiretapping 
on the Internet, 12 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 27 (2014). 
108 All large software products have a “ticketing system” where bug reports and feature 
requests are noted. In principle, this could be used to assess the bug rate, and many companies 
do this internally. However, this information is often carefully guarded. Ticketing systems for 
open source software are often public; however, distilling the data down to useful 
information—eliminating the duplicates, figuring out which entries are user error and hence 
incorrect, even deciding what is an actual bug and what is simply code that doesn’t work quite 
as desired, even if that is the intended behavior—requires a great deal of effort. Clint 
Fontanella, What’s a Ticketing System?, HUBSPOT (July 14, 2020), 
https://blog.hubspot.com/service/ticketing-system [https://perma.cc/LK8Y-7MY4]. 
Furthermore, it is unclear if the behavior of open source developers is similar enough to that of 
commercial developers. See, e.g., Steven M. Bellovin, The Open Source Quality Challenge, 
SMBLOG (Apr. 29, 2009), https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/blog/2009-04/2009-04-29.html 
[https://perma.cc/7TN3-HU53]; see also Brooks, supra note 87. 
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Microsoft provides an excellent case study. By 2001, the company 
realized it was in the throes of a security crisis. “‘No Microsoft 
executive could have any conversation with any enterprise customer 
about anything but Microsoft’s bad security,’ said Steve Lipner, who 
was the company’s director of security assurance at the time.”109 The 
Gartner Group warned its clients against using IIS, Microsoft’s web 
server.110 In response, in 2003, the company initiated a massive effort 
to produce more secure software111 and had all of its 8,500 Windows 
developers take security training.112 Within months the effort showed 
notable successes. Steven Lipner, who was Microsoft’s director of 
engineering strategy, told the New York Times, “Some of the tougher 
security standards . . . have shown measurable improvement in 
Windows Server 2003, which shipped earlier this year. The number of 
security vulnerabilities detected so far is half as many as at this stage 
after the release of Windows Server 2000.”113 Microsoft’s security 
development process has vastly improved the security of the company’s 
products (a measure of its effectiveness is that the process has been 
emulated by Cisco and Adobe).114 Nonetheless, security flaws (again, 
due to bugs) still occur: in August 2018, “Microsoft pushed 17 updates 
to fix at least 60 vulnerabilities in Windows and other software, 
including two ‘zero-day’ flaws that attackers were already exploiting 





109 LANDAU, supra note 65, at 64.   
110 Jack Kapica, Gartner Slams Microsoft IIS Server, GLOBE & MAIL (Sept. 25, 2001), 
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/technology/gartner-slams-microsoft-iis-
server/article22621594/ [https://perma.cc/8ZW2-EHZ6]. 
111 Steve Lohr, Fixing Flaws, Microsoft Invites Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2003), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/29/business/fixing-flaws-microsoft-invites-attack.html 
[https://perma.cc/5HWN-4YEX] (“At Microsoft, much more time is now being set aside in the 
design cycle of products for security considerations, a mandate approved by senior 
management this spring. ‘There is a shift from mainly an emphasis on working features to an 
emphasis on trustworthy and secure computing,’ said Steven B. Lipner, director of security 
engineering strategy at Microsoft.”). 
112 See LANDAU, supra note 65, at 64. 
113 Lohr, supra note 111. 
114 Tim Rains, The Secret of the SDL, MICROSOFT (July 2, 2014), 
https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2014/07/02/the-secret-of-the-sdl/ 
[https://perma.cc/9A4Z-W67H].   
115 Brian Krebs, Patch Tuesday, August 2018 Edition, KREBS ON SECURITY (Aug. 18, 2018), 
https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/08/patch-tuesday-august-2018-edition/ 
[https://perma.cc/2K6H-5MER]. 
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although good software development processes are a significant help, 
they are not a panacea; bugs (and security holes) have nevertheless 
persisted, more than fifteen years after Microsoft began its initiative. 
 
C. Testing and Assurance 
 
Naturally, software vendors are aware of this problem and try to find 
and eliminate bugs. The most common method is testing, which 
involves feeding assorted sample inputs to a program to see if the correct 
answer is produced. 116 This, however, has limitations. The most 
fundamental issue with testing was noted decades ago by Edsger 
Dijkstra, an esteemed computer scientist: “Program testing can be used 
to show the presence of bugs, but never to show their absence!”117 That 
is, a test case might yield an incorrect result, thereby demonstrating a 
bug; however, it is impossible to tell if there is a bug that has not been 
triggered by a particular set of inputs: there are far too many possible 
situations to try them all. In fact, it is mathematically impossible to find 
all failures.118 
 
Some problems fundamentally cannot be detected simply by testing. 
The most obvious example is encryption. By definition, the output of a 
good encryption algorithm is indistinguishable from a random string of 





116 See generally PAUL AMMANN & JEFF OFFUTT, INTRODUCTION TO SOFTWARE TESTING 
(Cambridge U. Press, 2d ed. 2017). 
117 Edsger W. Dijkstra, Structured Programming, in SOFTWARE ENGINEERING TECHS. 65, 66 (J. 
N. Buxton & B. Randell eds., 1970), 
http://homepages.cs.ncl.ac.uk/brian.randell/NATO/nato1969.PDF. 
118 AMMANN & OFFUTT, supra note 116, at 20 (“the problem of finding all failures in a 
program is undecidable.”). “Undecidable” is a technical term in computer science and 
mathematics; it means that no possible algorithm can always find the correct answer. 
Undecidability, U. OF ROCHESTER, 
https://www.cs.rochester.edu/u/nelson/courses/csc_173/computability/undecidable.html 
[https://perma.cc/RV9A-759Z]. 
119 The notion that ciphertext should be random is due to C. E. Shannon’s article 
Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems, but his phrasing is quite mathematical and does 
not quite match current usage. See C.E. Shannon, Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems, 
28 BELL SYS. TECH. J. 656, 656-715 (1949). A more accessible reference simply assumes that 
randomness is a requirement for a good cipher. JUAN SOTO, JR., U.S. DEPT. COM., 
RANDOMNESS TESTING OF THE ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD CANDIDATE ALGORITHMS 
(1999) (“One of the criteria used to evaluate the Advanced Encryption Standard candidate 
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from a random string, that algorithm is considered seriously flawed.120 
However, the presence of randomness is not itself sufficient for 
correctness; the encryption keys must also be chosen properly.121 That 
is a result of the principle established by Auguste Kerckhoffs in 1883: 
one cannot assume that the encryption algorithm is secret.122 Therefore, 
the security of an encryption algorithm must lie in the secrecy of the 
key, and ensuring that secrecy is thus critical to an encryption’s 
algorithm working appropriately.123 Unfortunately, testing will not 
necessarily reveal that secrecy. Two examples better illustrate this point. 
The first example concerned an encrypted version of the Telnet 
protocol.124 Due to a bug in the key generation mechanism, most of the 





algorithms was their demonstrated suitability as random number generators. That is, the 
evaluation of their output utilizing statistical tests should not provide any means by which to 
computationally distinguish them from a truly random source.”). The actual modern definition 
of encrypting a message, though quite mathematical, assumes that an ideal encryption 
algorithm generates a sequence of random bits. See, e.g., Shafi Goldwasser & Silvio Micali, 
Probabilistic Encryption, 28 J. COMPUT. & SYS. SCI. 270, 272 (1983) (“More specifically, a 
binary message will be encrypted bit-by-bit as follows: a “0” is encoded by randomly selecting 
an x such that B(x) = 0 and a “1” is encoded by randomly selecting an x such that B(x) = 1. 
Consequently, there are many possible encodings for each message. However, messages are 
always uniquely decodable.”).   
120 Goldwasser & Micali, supra note 119, at 271. 
121 Today, an encryption key is generally a very large number; depending on the particular 
encryption algorithm used, the keys can be tens or even hundreds of digits long. Rob Stubbs, 
Classification of Cryptographic Keys, CRYPTOMATHIC (Feb. 19, 2018), 
https://www.cryptomathic.com/news-events/blog/classification-of-cryptographic-keys-
functions-and-properties [https://perma.cc/JE5Y-ZSCP]. 
122 Auguste Kerckhoffs, La Cryptographie Militaire, 9 J. DES SCI. MILITAIRIES 5, 12 (1883) 
(Fr.) (“Il faut qu’il n’exige pas le secret, et qu’il puisse sans inconvénient tomber entre les 
mains de l’ennemi.” [“The system must not require secrecy and can be stolen by the enemy 
without causing trouble”]). 
123 Id. 
124 Telnet, a now-obsolescent protocol, was primarily used for command-line access to remote 
computers. Users thus had to enter a login name and password, hence the need for encryption. 
Tyson Supasatit, Can You Encrypt Telnet?, EXTRAHOP (Aug. 14, 2019), 
https://www.extrahop.com/company/blog/2019/telnet-security-how-to-encrypt-telnet-sessions/ 
[https://perma.cc/G4P5-2D2F]. 
125 The fact of the problem was announced in CERT Advisory CA-1995-03, but no details 
were provided, though the true situation was well known in the security community. CERT 
DIVISION, CARNEGIE MELLON U., 1995 CERT ADVISORIES 20 (Carnegie Mellon U. Software 
Engineering I. ed., 2017). According to a comment on a blog, the actual cause was deliberately 
obfuscated. John Gilmore, Comment to Vendors Are Bad for Security, LINKS: BEN LAURIE 
BLATHERING (May 13, 2008, 2:09 PM), https://www.links.org/?p=327 
[https://perma.cc/8NV7-WKSE]. 
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trivially decrypt the traffic.126 Simple testing would not have found the 
problem; the output would have looked random despite the constant 
key.127 Only an examination of the code itself would have demonstrated 
the problem that the same encryption key was being used for all inputs. 
 
The second incident was more sinister. The problems started with an 
algorithm for generating random numbers that was originally put forth 
by the National Security Agency (NSA). In NSA’s words, the agency 
had “covertly influence[d] and/or overtly leverage[d] . . . commercial 
products designs . . . mak[ing] the systems in question exploitable.” 128 
The system in question was Dual EC_DRBG, a random number 





126 CERT DIVISION, supra note 125; Gilmore, supra note 125. 
127 Because of technical details of how the encryption actually worked, multiple encryptions of 
the same data would look different, despite the fact that the same key was used. See generally, 
Mihir Bellare & Phillip Rogaway, Introduction to Modern Cryptography (2005) (collection of 
class notes), available at 
https://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/classes/227/spring05/book/main.pdf; JASON GARMAN, 
KERBEROS (2003); PETER LOSHIN, TCP/IP CLEARLY EXPLAINED 221-35 (4th ed. 2002). 
128 Secret Documents Reveal N.S.A. Campaign Against Encryption, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 
2013), https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/05/us/documents-
reveal-nsa-campaign-against-encryption.html [https://perma.cc/AYC3-FM5Z].   
129 Random numbers are used to generate encryption keys but finding genuinely random 
bits—that is to say, bits that are hard to predict—is a computationally difficult problem. 
Consequently, a common method instead is to start with some truly random bits, then use a 
mathematical function to expand these into a longer sequence of pseudo-random bits. The 
Elliptic Curve Digital Random Bit Generator (Dual EC-DRBG) is one such function; it uses 
elliptic curves to do so. The curve relies on two default parameters. The choice of these 
parameters is crucial, for anyone knowing the arithmetic relationship between the parameters 
would be able to predict the “random” numbers generated by the algorithm—making the 
random numbers highly nonrandom indeed. In particular, if encryption keys were based on 
these “random numbers,” anyone knowing the relationship between the two parameters would 
have a significant head start in guessing the bits of the encryption key. Despite early concerns 
about a possible cryptographic backdoor—such a backdoor permits a much more efficient 
search for the key, making the encryption algorithm far less secure than it would otherwise 
be—in Dual EC_DRBG, the National Institute for Standards and Technology recommended 
this method for generating random numbers. See DAN SHUMOW & NIELS FERGUSON, ON THE 
POSSIBILITY OF A BACK DOOR IN THE NIST SP800-90 DUAL EC PRNG 2-7 (2007), 
http://rump2007.cr.yp.to/15-shumow.pdf; see also ELAINE BARKER & JOHN KELSEY, U.S. 
DEP’T. COM., NIST SP 800-90, RECOMMENDATION FOR RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION USING 
DETERMINISTIC RANDOM BIT GENERATORS 13-67 (2007) (withdrawn in Jan. 2012 and 
succeeded by SP 800-90A). This was after RSA Security LLC had made the algorithm the 
default random bit generator in its popular BSafe encryption toolkit. Joseph Menn, Exclusive: 
Secret Contract Tied NSA and Security Industry Pioneer, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2013, 4:05 PM) 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-security-rsa/exclusive-secret-contract-tied-nsa-and-
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Principle; the security of the system lies in the security of the key. But 
the NSA effort meant that the bits of the key were predictable and thus 
that any information encrypted through that system could be easily 
decrypted by the NSA.  
 
In principle, the communication would, however, be secure against 
other interceptors, which did not know the relationship between a 
crucial two parameters—and thus could not easily guess the random bits 
and determine the encryption key. This situation did not last. A Juniper 
firewall used the DUAL_EC_DRBG random number generator. 
Apparently, someone switched the crucial parameters in the standard 
DUAL_EC_DRBG algorithm with other numbers; possibly, this 
allowed the party who did this to have its own back door.130 But simple 
testing would not detect the problem. The output would, after all, appear 
to be properly encrypted. 
 
But programmers had added a second back door to the Juniper 
firewall131 that allowed anyone who knew a secret password to log into 





security-industry-pioneer-idUSBRE9BJ1C220131220. The algorithm was widely used, 
including in such applications as SSL/TLS, the protocol for securing web transmissions. 
Matthew Greene, The Many Flaws of Dual EC-DRBG, A FEW THOUGHTS ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC 
ENG’G (Sept. 18, 2013), https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/18/the-many-
flaws-of-dualecdrbg/ [https://perma.cc/6YPJ-F4BA]. 
130 Stephen Checkoway et al., A Systematic Analysis of the Juniper Dual EC Incident, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2016 ACM SIGSAC CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS 
SECURITY 468. The full story is vastly more complicated and includes other back doors and 
bugs. “The Dual_EC generated initial output that was supposed to then be run through the 
ANSI generator. The output from the second random generator would theoretically cancel out 
any vulnerabilities that were inherent in the Dual_EC output. . . . Except Juniper’s system 
contained a bug, according to Willem Pinckaers, an independent security researcher in the San 
Francisco area who examined the system with Weinmann. Instead of using the second 
generator, it ignored this one and used only the output from the bad Dual_EC generator.” Kim 
Zetter, Researchers Solve Juniper Backdoor Mystery; Signs Point to NSA, WIRED (Dec. 22, 
2015, 1:29 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/12/researchers-solve-the-juniper-mystery-and-
they-say-its-partially-the-nsas-fault/ [https://perma.cc/2MEU-5EYW]. 
131 Sean Gallagher, Researchers Confirm Backdoor Password in Juniper Firewall Code, ARS 
TECHNICA (Dec. 21, 2015, 1:15 PM), https://arstechnica.com/information-
technology/2015/12/researchers-confirm-backdoor-password-in-juniper-firewall-code/ 
[https://perma.cc/H7YQ-GNHT]. 
132 Checkoway et al., supra note 131, at 468. It is not known if the two back doors were 
inserted by the same party or by different parties. Zetter, supra note 131. 
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%s(un='%s') = %u,” a value that resembles a string that might be used 
for debugging.133 There is no conceivable testing regimen that would 
have found this flaw. 
 
There are still other ways that programming bugs may lay hidden. 
Sometimes, bugs can be very rare or highly unlikely because they are 
timing-dependent. Consider the space shuttle bug.134 The details are 
complex; let it suffice to say that it would only occur one out of sixty-
seven times the shuttle’s computers were booted.135 The AT&T network 
flaw would only be triggered when certain events occurred within 1/100 
of a second of each other.136 Testing would be very unlikely to uncover 
this issue. 
 
There have been inexplicable problems in forensic software too. In one 
case in Pennsylvania, three different experts concluded there was a 
DNA match to the defendant, but their probability estimates—all 
derived from software—differed wildly.137 It is impossible to 
understand such differences without access to the source code, nor, for 
that matter, to know if the problem is a different mathematical model or 
simply code that implements the model incorrectly. 
 
The limitations of testing have, of course, led to the development of 
other methods for finding and eliminating software bugs. Those have 
helped but have not solved the problem. In a previous work, several of 
us summarized the issue this way: 
 
We will not recount the myriad techniques other than 





133 Gallagher, supra note 131; see also, infra Section II.D. (discussing programmer blindness).   
134 See Garman, supra note 102.  
135 Id. at 9. 
136 See STERLING, supra note 104, at 48. 
137 Commonwealth v. Foley, 38 A.3d 882, 887 (2012) (“The experts differed in their estimates 
of the probability that someone other than Foley would possess DNA matching the DNA 
found in the sample—Conway testified that the probability that another Caucasian could 
be the contributor was 1 in 13,000; Dr. Cotton testified that the probability was 1 in 23 
million; and Dr. Perlin testified that it was 1 in 189 billion.”); see also Stephanie J. Lacambra 
et al., Opening the Black Box: Defendants’ Rights to Confront Forensic Software, CHAMPION, 
May 2018, at 28, https://www.eff.org/files/2018/07/30/champion_article_-
_lacambra_forensic_software_may_2018_07102018.pdf. 
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let it suffice to say there have been many. These include 
formal mathematical methods, better programming and 
debugging tools, different organizational and procedural 
schemes, improved programming languages, and more. 
Many of these ideas have helped, but none have proved 
a panacea. The ability to produce error-free code is the 
Holy Grail of systems development: heavily desired but 
unattainable.138 
 
In summary, software as it exists today (and likely for the foreseeable 
future) will always have bugs. Consequently, criminal defendants need 
access to source code to safeguard their constitutional rights. 
 
D. Adversarial Audits 
 
In light of the axiomatic notion that software will always have bugs, the 
question then becomes how courts should address this problem. Our 
basic thesis is that adversarial audits—examination and testing of 
software by defendants—is necessary for a fair trial. Put another way, 
we assert that outside testing will find flaws that the vendor did not. 
Why should this be? 
 
In one sense, this is a statement that does not require proof. The 
American legal system is fundamentally based on the premise that the 
adversarial system is the best way to reach the truth. Indeed, as legal 
scholar Ralph Grunewald has written, “[t]he Supreme Court shares the 
view that facts are best proven dialectically through a complex process 
of persuasion and holds that truth ‘is best discovered by powerful 
statements on both sides of the question.’”139 Furthermore, “[t]he very 
premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan 
advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate 






138 Bellovin et al., supra note 107, at 28. 
139 Ralph Grunewald, Comparing Injustices: Truth, Justice, and the System, 77 ALB. L. REV. 
1139, 1156 (2014) (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655 (1984)). 
140 Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975).  
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Even in technical matters, one side’s expert witness testimony is 
rebutted by cross-examination and the other side’s experts, rather than 
having the judge appoint and question a neutral witness. There is no a 
priori reason why software issues should be handled differently. There 
are also several technical reasons to treat software witnesses in the same 
manner as human expert witnesses. These include the inability of 
programmers to see their own errors, the fact that the program 
specifications141 themselves may be in error (and thus although the 
program matches the specifications, the program does not do what it 
should be doing), inadequacy of testing data, and, finally, the proof 
history: too many programs viewed as correct have been shown to 
function incorrectly when subjected to adversarial audits that have 
uncovered serious errors. We discuss each of these phenomena in turn. 
 
The first is a phenomenon we will call “programmer blindness.” Just as 
writers are often bad at proofreading their own text, programmers are 
bad at reading their own code. Their eyes will skip over errors. This 
deficiency is often countered by peer review when someone else reads 
over the code before it is put into the production system,142 but even that 
is not a fail-safe method. It is often the case that peers are not truly 
independent reviewers because programmers often have similar 
training—and thus tend to make the same mistakes.143 
 
Just as there are excellent editors and proofreaders, there are also people 
who are skilled at avoiding conventional assumptions about software. 
This ability is at the heart of computer security, whether one is trying to 
protect a system or break into it.144 Few companies have such people on 
their development teams, but a diligent defense attorney could and 
should seek one out. Indeed, as we increasingly rely on software for 
providing evidence and making decisions, such a person should be part 





141 See discussion of erroneous specifications infra Section II.D. 
142 See, e.g., Peter C. Rigby & Christian Bird, Convergent Contemporary Software Peer 
Review Practices, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2013 9TH JOINT MEETING ON FOUNDATIONS OF 
SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 202, 203 (2013).  
143 See generally John C. Knight & Nancy G. Leveson, An Experimental Evaluation of the 
Assumption of Independence in Multiversion Programming, 12 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON 
SOFTWARE ENG’G 96, 97 (1986). 
144 See generally STEVEN M. BELLOVIN, THINKING SECURITY (2016). 




Second, software testing is done according to the program’s 
requirements and specifications.145 In other words, a party external to 
the programming team defines the objective: what the inputs and 
outputs should look like, how errors should be handled, how fast the 
program must run, etc. The tester’s job is to take each requirement and 
verify that it is met. Often, though, the specifications themselves are 
faulty. In one study of fifty actual security errors, researchers found that 
twenty two of them were due to errors in the requirements or 
specifications.146 Ordinary testing will not uncover such problems 
because the program matches the specifications; the problem is that the 
specifications themselves are incorrect.147 
 
The third reason is the nature of testing in the software development 
process. Software testing is not random; rather, the tester carefully crafts 





145 This is well understood by practitioners, though not always discussed in the academic 
literature. But see Gilles Bernot et al., Software Testing Based on Formal Specifications: A 
Theory and a Tool, 6 SOFTWARE ENG’G J. 387, 387 (1991) (“With the emergence of formal 
specification languages, it becomes possible to also start from the specification to define some 
testing strategies in a rigorous and formal framework.”). 
146 See Carl E. Landwehr et al., A Taxonomy of Computer Program Security Flaws, 26 ACM 
COMPUTING SURV. 211, 216 (1994).  
147 Because the specifications for commercial programs are rarely published, and because 
these specifications are often extremely technical, we generally learn of such errors only when 
a security hole or serious bug is found that can be traced back by outsiders to a specification. 
A recently discovered flaw in Microsoft Windows—a flaw that is more than 20 years old—
provides just such an example. In Windows, a program running in one window can send a 
message to a program running in another window. These messages can be things like “resize 
yourself,” “terminate,”, “open this URL,” “here is some input,” and more. Since some 
programs have more privileges than others—software installers need high privileges to change 
the system, while browsers (which are vulnerable to nasty web pages) have fewer permissions 
than normal—the ability to send such messages is normally restricted. However, Microsoft 
implemented the “Text Services Framework” to handle such functionality as Chinese language 
input. Obviously, a multilingual input program must be able to talk to all other running 
programs, so there were no restrictions for any such messages. This in turn allowed for 
improper messages to be sent by an attack program that pretended to be part of this 
framework, which in turn led to security problems. See Jim Salter, A Look at the Windows 10 
Exploit Google Zero Disclosed this Week, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 15 2019, 6:45 AM), 
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/08/a-look-at-the-windows-10-exploit-
google-zero-disclosed-this-week/ [https://perma.cc/9ZXF-XBPB].  
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based: try inputs that stress or exceed requirements.148 This approach 
tries to find what are known as “boundary conditions,” which are places 
where the behavior of the program is likely to change.149 For example, 
if a certain input field is allowed to be 200 characters long, a tester might 
try 199, 200, 201, and 2000 character inputs. Similarly, because 
2,147,483,647 is the largest number some programs can handle, 
2,147,483,648 is a useful test.150  
 
Another testing strategy is code-based. There are certain technical 
aspects of the code that suggest certain inputs should be tried. For 
example, it is desirable to exercise as much of the program as possible. 
A mechanism known as a “code coverage tool”151 tells the tester which 
lines of the software have or have not been exercised. Referring back to 
our subtraction example,152 such a tool could verify that both branches 
of the “if” statement were tested. However, modern software is so 
complex that complete coverage during testing is not possible because 
there are just too many possibilities. In a testing trial, though, certain 
input values might be fixed to allow testers to vary other inputs in a way 
that would not have been feasible during the development process.  
 
The Draeger Alcotest 9510 breathalyzer provides an example of how a 





148 See AMMANN & OFFUTT, supra note 116, at 150 (“The input domain is defined in terms of 
the possible values that the input parameters can have. . . . The tester does not need to 
understand the implementation; everything is based on a description of the inputs.”). 
149 The optimal strategy for generating good test data is in fact an active research area. See, 
e.g., Mats Grindal et al., Combination Testing Strategies: A Survey, 15 SOFTWARE TESTING, 
VERIFICATION, AND RELIABILITY 167, 167 (2005) (“A literature search has revealed 16 
different combination strategies described through more than 40 papers published between 
1985 and 2004.”). 
150 Generally, modern computers use 32-bit integers. One bit is used to indicate positive or 
negative; the range of integer values therefore ranges from -2,147,483,648 to 2,147,438,647. 
See Nickolas T. Lanza, How Do You Get the Maximum and Minimum Values for Integer Data 
Types Based on the Operating System?, MEDIUM (Jan. 29, 2018), 
https://medium.com/@nickolasteixeira/how-to-explain-to-my-wife-what-i-do-how-do-you-
get-the-maximum-and-minimum-values-for-integer-befdc263a3a2 [perma.cc/9EJ2-26F7]. 
151 See, e.g., Mustafa M. Tikir & Jeffrey K. Hollingsworth, Efficient Instrumentation for Code 
Coverage Testing, 27 SIGSOFT SOFTWARE ENG’G NOTES 86, 86 (2002). The purpose of testing 
is, of course, to ensure that the code is correct. If test cases do not exercise certain lines of 
code, then the test cases cannot have verified whether those lines of code are correct. 
152 See supra Section II.A.  
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press reports, the unit is sensitive to variations in the outside 
temperature.153 An adversarial examination of such a device could test 
it at the observed temperature during the police stop, rather than what 
was available in the vendor’s test lab. 
 
The fourth reason why software issues should be treated differently is 
purely empirical. In other scenarios, adversarial testing has found flaws 
in software that had been certified by outside parties. The best-
documented example is voting machines, where outside auditors have 
always found flaws. 
 
One of the first published independent audits of election systems was of 
leaked code to a Diebold electronic voting system.154 The authors’ 
conclusion, after analysis, was blunt: “Our analysis shows that this 
voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards 
applicable in other contexts.”155 They also noted problematic aspects 
that could only be learned by looking at the complete source code.156 
For example, they found no indications that any formal requirements 
documents or ticket tracker were used even though both of these are, as 
noted, part of most structured development processes.157 
 
Another well-known example is California’s “top-to-bottom review” of 
the electronic voting machines that were to be used in its 2008 elections. 
Independent teams were contracted to examine the system source code 
for vulnerabilities that might not have been discovered in the 





153 See Zack Whittaker, Researchers Say a Breathalyzer Has Flaws, Casting Doubt on 
Countless Convictions, ZDNET (May 10, 2018), https://www.zdnet.com/article/draeger-
breathalyzer-breath-test-convictions/ [https://perma.cc/6QER-ZKJN]. 
154 T. Kohno et al., Analysis of an Electronic Voting System, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE 
SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY 27, 28 (2004), available at 
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1301313.  
155 Id. at 27. 
156 Id. at 37. 
157 Id. at 34. 
158 Cal. Secretary of State, Top-to-Bottom Review of Electronic Voting Systems Certified for 
Use in California Elections, (draft for public comment Mar. 22, 
2007), https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ovsta/frequently-requested-information/top-bottom-
review [https://perma.cc/2DM3-F2GJ] (archiving documents related to the review). The 
review was initiated by then-Secretary of State Debra Bowen, pursuant to her responsibilities 
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integrity of every one of the systems. A review of one evaluated system 
explained that “[v]irtually every important software security mechanism 
is vulnerable to circumvention.”159 Moreover, the previous certification 
processes160 failed to catch bugs that one would expect to have been 
caught: “There is evidence in the documentation of vendor-initiated 
source code reviews as part of the independent testing process, however 
the broken cryptography architecture indicates that more audits by 
qualified security experts are required.”161 
 
Subsequent adversarial examinations of voting systems have shown 
similar results, as summarized by author Matt Blaze in his 2017 
Congressional testimony, which reported that every current voting 
system examined over the course of a weekend at the DEFCON hacking 
conference was found to suffer from exploitable vulnerabilities due to 
unpatched or undetected software defects.162  
 
Computerized voting systems provide interesting parallels to the 
software systems used to collect and process evidence in criminal cases. 





in accordance with California law. Id. 
159 MATT BLAZE ET AL., SOURCE CODE REVIEW OF THE SEQUOIA VOTING SYSTEM 82 (2007), 
https://votingsystems.cdn.sos.ca.gov/oversight/ttbr/sequoia-source-public-jul26.pdf. 
160 There are no national standards for the certification of voting systems. Each state 
jurisdiction sets its own requirements, which are often administered on an ad hoc basis. 
California requires certification by the Secretary of State, Cal. Elec. Code § 19006(a) 
(West 2014) (“All voting systems be certified or conditionally approved by the Secretary of 
State, independent of voluntary federal qualification or certification, before they are used in 
future elections to ensure that the voting systems have the ability to meet accuracy, 
accessibility, and security standards.”). The Federal standards are voluntary. See Help 
America Vote Act of 2002, 52 U.S.C. § 20961(b)(1) (2002) (“The Development Committee 
shall assist the Executive Director of the Commission in the development of the voluntary 
voting system guidelines”); id. § 21001(d) (“Nothing in this subpart may be construed to 
require a State to implement any of the voluntary voting system guidelines or any of the 
voluntary guidance adopted by the Commission with respect to any matter as a condition for 
receiving a requirements payment.”).  
161 BLAZE ET AL., supra note 159, at 42. 
162 Cybersecurity of Voting Machines: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and 
Gov’t Reform, Subcomm. on Info. Tech., & Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Affs., 115 Cong. 
11 (2017) (statement of Matt Blaze, Assoc. Professor, U. Pa.).   
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systems are, by virtue of their design, too complex and unreliable to be 
relied upon for determining the outcomes of civil elections.163 
 
The consensus that software is inherently unreliable and suspect has led 
elections experts to advocate for election system designs that do not 
depend on software for the correctness of election outcomes. A widely 
recognized statement of this criteria was proposed by computer scientist 
Ronald Rivest as Software Independence.164 In particular: 
 
A voting system is strongly software-independent if an 
undetected change or error in its software cannot cause 
an undetectable change or error in an election outcome, 
and moreover, a detected change or error in an election 
outcome (due to change or error in the software) can be 
corrected without re-running the election.165  
 
At first blush, a requirement for software independence might appear to 
preclude the use of any software (or computers) in elections altogether. 
But that is not necessarily the case. Software independence simply 
requires that any software-based system be designed in a way that 
allows for recovery of correct results even if the software had failed in 
some way. For example, a voting system that employs paper ballots 
(marked by a voter) might perform an initial tally by computerized 
scanners, but still retain the ability to use the original paper ballots 
(which reflect the true intent of the voters) for recounts and audits, 
which can be conducted by hand and without dependence on the 
software.166 Such a system uses software, yet is still software 






163 See generally NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, AND MED., SECURING THE VOTE: PROTECTING 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2018), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/25120/securing-the-vote-
protecting-american-democracy [https://perma.cc/B9PU-FDEQ]. 
164 See generally Ronald L. Rivest & John P. Wack, On the Notion of ‘Software Independence’ 
in Voting Systems, 366 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS SERIES A, MATHEMATICAL, PHYSICAL, AND ENG’G 
SCIS. 3759 (2008), https://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/RivestWack-
OnTheNotionOfSoftwareIndependenceInVotingSystems.pdf. 
165 Id. at 3763. 
166 See id. 
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Flaws in voting systems threaten the integrity of an election; flaws in 
DNA analysis software can put the wrong person in jail. In one widely 
publicized incident, defense attorneys in New York City were granted 
access to the source code to the Forensic Statistical Tool (“FST”) 
developed by the office of the chief medical examiner.167 On a motion 
from ProPublica, the software was made publicly available and 
affidavits from a defense expert witness were unsealed.168 He explained 
that by examining the source code he was able to learn of behavior in 
the match calculation that was never documented anywhere: 
 
An instance of undocumented behavior of the FST 
program is noted in the calculation of likelihood ratios 
performed in “Comparison.cs”. A routine included in the 
source code file (“Comparison” class), named 
“CheckFrequencyForRemoval” appears to perform the 
following behavior: 
1. Check all replicate (evidentiary) genotypes for any 
locus that contains alleles whose frequency sums to ≥ 
0.97 in any of the four subpopulations (“Asian,” “Black,” 
“Caucasian,” and “Hispanic). 
2. Remove these loci from the likelihood ratio 
calculations. 
During this review, I encountered no notice, either 
intended or actual, provided to the user of FST that any 
loci were removed from the likelihood ratio calculation. 
I found no indication that this behavior is intended during 







167 Lauren Kirchner, Federal Judge Unseals New York Crime Lab’s Software for Analyzing 
DNA Evidence, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 20, 2017, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/federal-judge-unseals-new-york-crime-labs-software-for-
analyzing-dna-evidence [https://perma.cc/4BPK-RUJD].  
168 Lauren Kirchner, Traces of Crime: How New York’s DNA Techniques Became Tainted, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/04/nyregion/dna-analysis-
evidence-new-york-disputed-techniques.html [https://perma.cc/8A7T-MPFU]. 
169 Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion in Limine, Exhibit C at 20, United States 
v. Johnson, S.D.N.Y 2016 (1:15-cr-00565-VEC). 
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Furthermore, the behavioral change in the match calculation was done 
after the validation study of the FST package: “There is at least one 
indication of a deviation in behavior between the version of FST used 
during its validation study and the version of FST provided to me.” 170 
 
Beyond that example, there may be other lurking problems. Deviation 
from good coding practice is a red flag. Systems engineer Nathaniel 
Adams wrote: 
 
Martin Fowler describes code smells as, “A code smell 
is a surface indication that usually corresponds to a 
deeper problem in the system.” In this sense, a smell is 
not a defect in itself but is a deviation from good coding 
practices, which can indicate underlying software 
defects. Coding conventions and style guides purposely 
prevent code smells. Coding practices such as writing 
long routines or complex classes can obfuscate 
underlying issues due to the difficulty of comprehending 
large segments of code.171  
 
He goes on to note that “[t]he FST source code presents a number of 
basic smells such as routine length and complex classes.”172 In other 
words, the style of coding suggests that the program is below normal 
professional standards and may have other, not yet detected problems. 
It is extremely difficult to detect such “smells” without access to source 
code. 
 
We thus see that, as an empirical matter, adversarial audits can uncover 
relevant issues in software relied upon in prosecutions. We are not 
aware of any studies of why this should be—why independently 
certified software should prove so vulnerable when subjected to an 
adversarial audit. We speculate that, in the absence of such audits, there 
is little basis for comparison other than price, and hence little 





170 Id. at Exhibit A, at 9.  
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to code developed in a competitive market, where base functionality is 
all-important and the winner is often the first player to the market: 
security often takes a back seat.173 If price is in fact the primary 
differentiator, vendors’ primary incentives are to reduce their costs, e.g., 
by reducing the cost of the entire software development process. 
 
We do not mean to suggest that adversarial audits are a panacea. 
Nevertheless, experience shows that they do help. 
 
E. Machine Learning 
 
Machine learning algorithms raise a different set of issues.174 Machine 
learning algorithms, popularly known as “artificial intelligence” or 
“AI,” are at the heart of many of today’s technologies, including all 
major search engines.175 However, these algorithms have to be 
“trained,” i.e., fed known initial data.176 If the training data is deficient, 
the output of the algorithm will be incorrect. 
 
This problem has arisen a number of times. Professor Ignacio Cofone 
wrote: 
 
An illustrative employment example is a machine 
learning system that Amazon recently developed to rank 
job candidates. The system displayed a significant bias 
against female candidates, justifiably triggering public 
outcry. Because the algorithm was trained using 
Amazon’s existing hiring data under the idea that 





173 NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL ET AL., TRUST IN CYBERSPACE 67 (Fred B. Schneider ed., 1998) 
(“For software-intensive products, early arrival in the marketplace is often critical to success 
in that marketplace. This means that software development practice becomes distorted to 
maximize functionality and minimize development time, with little attention paid to other 
qualities. Thus, functionality takes precedence over trustworthiness.”). 
174 See generally Steven M. Bellovin et al., Privacy and Synthetic Datasets, 22 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 1 (2019), for a description of machine learning. 
175 Gabriel Jiménez, Artificial Intelligence Applications in Search Engines, MEDIUM (Dec. 18, 
2018), https://medium.com/aimarketingassociation/artificial-intelligence-applications-in-
search-engines-437c57f8b265 [https://perma.cc/H77S-A55W]. 
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Amazon’s desired employee choices, the algorithm 
reflected existing hiring practices. These practices, 
however, to the surprise of the algorithm’s programmers, 
ended up being sexist.177 
 
Microsoft had similar problems with its Tay “chatbot.” A chatbot is 
designed to respond to users who send it messages, learning as it goes. 
However, Tay learned from the worst of the Internet, going “full Nazi” 
in less than 24 hours.178 Microsoft realized that the problem was training 
data, saying “[i]n an emailed statement given later to Business Insider . 
. . : ‘The AI chatbot Tay is a machine learning project, designed for 
human engagement. As it learns, some of its responses are inappropriate 
and indicative of the types of interactions some people are having with 
it.’”179 
 
In other words, for software based on machine learning, defendants 
should have access not only to the source code but also to the training 
data. Without that data, it is impossible to understand what output a 
program might produce. In explaining problems with automated 
analysis of computer programs, Professor Kroll et al. wrote: 
 
Perhaps the most obvious approach is to disclose a 
system’s source code, but this is at best a partial solution 
to the problem of accountability for automated decisions. 
The source code of computer systems is illegible to 
nonexperts. In fact, even experts often struggle to 
understand what software code will do: inspecting source 
code is a very limited way of predicting how a computer 
program will behave. Machine learning, one increasingly 
popular approach to automated decision making, is 





177 Ignacio Cofone, Algorithmic Discrimination Is an Information Problem, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 
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involves situations where the decisional rule itself 
emerges automatically from the specific data under 
analysis, sometimes in ways that no human can 
explain.180 
 
The same, of course, is true for evidentiary software. 
 
III. Source Code and Constitutional Issues  
 
Software and algorithms now play a critical role in many criminal 
prosecutions. Depriving such defendants access to the underlying code 
risks depriving defendants of their rights. For example, there are many 
ways for criminal defendants to challenge breathalyzer results, 
including attacks of the device’s margin of error, its calibration, and the 
breath sample itself.181 However, there are not many examples in which 
courts analyzed the use of algorithms and software, let alone whether 
any errors in specific program should be the basis for a challenge by 
criminal defendants. Indeed, courts have often been challenged by new 
technological developments.182 
 
Some state courts have received challenges to convictions using various 
types of breathalyzers.183 The defendants typically argued for the ability 
to examine the source code for these devices. They generally make two 
types of arguments. First, they argue that the source code must be 
provided pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, in which the Court held that 
prosecutors must provide defendants with all exculpatory evidence.184 
Second, defendants assert the failure to provide the source code violates 





180 See Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 638 (2017). 
181 Paul A. Clark, The Right to Challenge the Accuracy of Breath Test Results Under Alaska 
Law, 30 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 6-8 (2013). 
182 See generally Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 
(2001). 
183 Cowley & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 39. 
184 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that the prosecution must provide 
exculpatory evidence to a defendant). The case involved a murder committed by one of two 
men being tried in separate trials; the prosecution had a confession from the murderer but 
failed to share this evidence with the other. 
185 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also People v. Umpierre, 951 N.Y.S.2d 382, 383 (Sup. Ct. 
2012); State v. Lindner, 252 P.3d 1033, 1036 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (finding against the 
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maintain that denial of access to source code constitutes a due process 
violation.186 We discuss each of these approaches in turn.  
 
A. Brady Violations 
 
The Supreme Court in Brady was very clear: the prosecution must 
provide exculpatory evidence to a defendant. In Brady, two people, the 
petitioner and another person, were charged with first degree murder, 
but tried separately.187 At trial, Brady conceded his guilt in the murder, 
but argued that he did not kill the victim.188 In preparation for trial, his 
defense attorney sought the extrajudicial statements by the other 
person.189 The prosecution withheld one in which he admitted to 
committing the killing.190 The Supreme Court held “that the suppression 
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request 
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution.”191 
 
In cases where software provides evidence, courts have had varying 
interpretations of Brady. In some sense, the issue is what constitutes 
“suppression”—for if the prosecution does not have access to the source 
code behind evidence in the case, the prosecution cannot be considered 
to be suppressing such evidence.  
 
The 2008 decision City of Fargo v. Levine before the North Dakota 
Supreme Court involved Glenn Levine, whom the police had arrested 
for driving under the influence based in part on the results of an 
Intoxilyzer.192 Levine retained Dr. Robert Howard as an expert because 





defendant’s assertion that failure to provide breathalyzer source code violates the 
Confrontation Clause).   
186 See Lindner, 252 P.3d at 1034, n.1 (stating that defendant also raised due process right to 
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Drug Testing, a company providing third-party drug and alcohol testing 
for employers.”193 In his work, Howard was familiar with the 
Intoxilyzer as well as having professional experience writing source 
code.194 Howard explained that “the source code used in Intoxilyzer 
machines varies among jurisdictions and, when purchasing a machine, 
the buyer specifies certain types of programming.”195 He testified that 
without the specific Intoxilyzer’s source code, he could not properly 
analyze Levine’s results, but the trial court nonetheless denied the 
motion to compel production of the source code.196 
 
The North Dakota Supreme Court explained that the prosecutor neither 
possessed nor controlled the Intoxilyzer source code.197 Levine had 
furthermore failed to provide any evidence that that city possessed or 
controlled the source code in its Intoxilyzer.198 The state supreme court 
concluded that the prosecutor did not commit a Brady violation by 
failing to produce source code that was not in the city’s possession.199   
 
In 2008, the Supreme Court of Montana also heard a challenge to a 
denial of a request for the source code for the Intoxilyzer 8000.200 In 
Peters, CMI, the manufacturer of the Intoxilyzer 8000, raised concerns 
about trade secrets in Kentucky state court.201 However, CMI agreed to 
provide the defense expert access to the source code in its Kentucky 
corporate headquarters subject to a protective order that required the 
defense expert to destroy his computer hard drive when he completed 
the review and left CMI headquarters.202 Although the defense expert 
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200 State v. Peters, 264 P.3d 1124, 1127 (Mont. 2011).   
201 Id. at 1127; see also Wexler, supra note 11, at 1419 (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron 
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490 (1974)) (“The U.S. Supreme Court has even recognized that the 
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agreements to be too restrictive and declined to sign them.203 
Specifically, the defense expert explained that he feared signing the 
CMI agreements because the company “‘threaten[ed] my license to 
practice law if I violated’” the agreements.204 He further explained that 
“‘it’s not that I won’t sign it. I don’t believe I can sign it—without 
subjecting myself to sanctions.’”205 In other words, the criminal 
defendants were not able to present any defense to the charge against 
him because CMI essentially cowed the expert witness by threatening 
his livelihood and liberty.   
 
In Peters, the Supreme Court of Montana explained that the prosecution 
did not have the Intoxilyzer 8000 source code.206 It determined that 
because CMI did provide the defense expert reasonable access to the 
source code the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the 
information that the prosecution was required to provide.207 
Consequently, the Supreme Court of Montana declined to address 
claims based on either a Brady violation or the Confrontation Clause.208 
However, this approach ignored the legitimate concerns raised by the 
defense expert.   
 
Meanwhile in 2012, in State v. West, the Court of Appeals of Oregon 
considered Donald West’s appeal of his drunk driving conviction.209 
Defense counsel challenged the results of an Intoxilyzer 8000.210 
Oregon law establishes a presumption of admissibility of the 
breathalyzer results provided that they comply with methods approved 
by the Oregon Department of State Police.211 Rules issued by Oregon’s 
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In West, the appellate court explained that the prosecution had met its 
Brady obligations because it provided all information that it had 
regarding the Intoxilyzer 8000.213 Defense counsel had furthermore 
failed to demonstrate that the source code was material, but instead 
simply posited that it “‘could be used to show the manufacturer’s bias 
toward producing evidence that will lead to convictions.’”214 
Consequently, the appellate court determined that “Brady is not 
authority for a defendant obtaining evidence of unknown import to test 
whether it helps or hurts his case.”215   
 
In 2013, in State v. Marino, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina 
heard an appeal challenging a jury verdict finding Jory Marino guilty of 
driving while intoxicated.216 Defense counsel filed a motion seeking 
Brady material, which the trial judge essentially granted ordering that 
the prosecution provide defense counsel “with ‘all downloaded and non-
downloaded data in its possession that was generated from [the] 
Intoximeter [used to analyze defendant’s breath.]’”217 But the trial judge 
did not order the production of the Intoximeter’s source code.218 This 
meant that the defense was not in a position to determine if the 
Intoximeter breath analysis software worked correctly.219   
 
Pursuant to Brady, a “prosecutor is not required to deliver his entire file 
to defense counsel, but only to disclose evidence favorable to the 
accused that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair 
trial.”220 Missing from the decision is any clarification of who decides 
what suppressed information might deprive the defendant of a fair trial. 
How do they make that determination?   
 
In Marino, the appellate court determined that defense counsel had not 
established that the Intoximeter source code would be favorable or 
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phase of his prosecution.221 The court moreover characterized defense 
counsel’s interest in this source code and the possibility that it could 
result in exculpatory evidence to be speculative at best.222 The court did 
not acknowledge—and perhaps did not know—that software often lies, 
not out of programmers’ malfeasance, but as a result of design or coding 
errors. In Marino, the appellate court noted that Brady evidence must be 
favorable or material to guilt or punishment.223 However, it ignored the 
significant factor that the prosecution must actually possess evidence in 
order to be able to determine whether the evidence is favorable.224 
Without the code to examine, the defense is not a position to make this 
determination either. The court is effectively setting up a Catch-22 
proposition.  
 
The fact that prosecutors often do not have any copies of the 
breathalyzer source code is a significant issue regarding Brady 
concerns. In Minnesota, a trial judge ordered the prosecution to produce 
to the defense attorney “the complete computer source code for the 
operation of the Minnesota model of the Intoxilyzer 5000 currently in 
use.”225 Specifically, the trial judge determined that Minnesota “owned 
the source code for the Intoxilyzer 5000EN model created exclusively 
for the state.”226   
 
In response to this order, the Commissioner filed a writ of prohibition 
with the appellate court seeking to bar the trial judge from enforcing this 
order.227 The fact that Minnesota owned part of the source code pursuant 
to its contract with CMI was significant for the Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s decision to uphold the appellate court.228 Specifically, the state 
supreme court rejected the Commissioner’s argument that he did not 
possess or control the source code based on this contractual language.229 
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determined that Minnesota had the source code and should produce it 
consistent with the trial judge’s order. It stands as a contrast to the 
situations where prosecutors do not have access to the source code.    
 
Defendants have generally failed in obtaining the source code for 
breathalyzers based on arguments pursuant to Brady. For example, they 
often cannot demonstrate the need for the source code. It is, of course, 
extremely difficult to prove that the source code has errors if the code is 
not available for examination. The other wrinkle is that often the 
prosecution can establish that it does not have the source code either. 
Consequently, a court cannot very well compel the prosecution to 
produce something that it does not possess.230   
 
B. Confrontation Clause  
 
In addition to Brady challenges, criminal defendants may argue that the 
failure to provide the source code for breathalyzers also violates the 
Confrontation Clause. Specifically, the Sixth Amendment of the 
Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him.”231  
 
One might think that this is a straightforward rule, but in recent years it 
has become anything but. The confusing situation had its genesis in a 
relatively uncomplicated murder case, Crawford v. Washington that, 
due to issues of admissibility of evidence from the defendant’s wife, 
made its way to the Supreme Court.232 The evidence in that decision 





230 One problem is that CMI may not have the source code for a 
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Crawford stretch all the way to software. We discuss the Confrontation 
Clauses in two parts: (i) how the courts have ruled about expert witness 
testimony post Crawford and (ii) the implications of Crawford on 
evidentiary software. 
 
1. Expert Witness Testimony post-Crawford 
 
Interpreting the Confrontation Clause, the United States Supreme Court 
determined that the clause afforded criminal defendants the right to 
cross-examine any witnesses who “bear testimony” against the 
defendant.233 In Crawford, the defendant, Michael Crawford, 
confronted a man he believed had attempted to rape his wife, Sylvia 
Crawford.234 Believing the alleged rapist was reaching for a weapon, 
Michael Crawford stabbed the man.235 Sylvia Crawford’s statement to 
the police did not corroborate her husband’s claim of self-defense, and 
Michael Crawford was charged with attempted murder.236   
 
 
The prosecution sought to have Ms. Crawford testify, but Washington’s 
spousal privilege law prevented her from testifying against her husband 
without his consent.237 The prosecution was able to introduce the wife’s 
statement because it was admissible pursuant to a hearsay exception.238 
The defendant argued that the statement’s admission violated his 
Confrontation Clause rights.239 The trial court admitted the statement, 
finding that it had “adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’”240 After the jury 
found Crawford guilty, the state appellate court reversed finding that the 
statement was inadmissible before the Washington Supreme Court 
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The United States Supreme Court grappled with whether the admission 
of Ms. Crawford’s out-of-court statement violated the Confrontation 
Clause because the defendant could not cross-examine the statement.242 
In a unanimous decision, the Court determined that its admission 
violated Crawford’s Sixth Amendment rights.243 Justice Scalia wrote 
that the Framers of the Constitution intended the Confrontation Clause 
to bar these types of out-of-court statements.244 In finding Ms. 
Crawford’s statement inadmissible, the Court overruled Ohio v. 
Roberts,245 and determined that analysis of the statement’s reliability 
was inadequate in preserving the Sixth Amendment rights and that 
courts must address the evidence’s testimonial nature.246   
 
Evidence deemed to be testimonial may not be introduced against a 
criminal defendant unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant 
had a previous opportunity to cross-examine the witness regarding the 
substance of the proposed evidentiary statement.247 Legal scholar 
Jennifer Mnookin explained that in Crawford a critical issue concerned 
whether “the statement [was] made in circumstances that suggest[s] its 
likely future relevance as testimony in a criminal [trial]?”248 Thus, 
business records, Call Detail Records, web searches, and the like would 
not be covered by Crawford decision’s analytical reasoning249—but 
breathalyzer tests and DNA tests are.  
 
In Crawford, the Court dealt with testimonial evidence in the case of a 
human witness whose testimony the prosecution introduced during the 
trial, but who was not available for cross examination by the defendant 
during trial.250 Our interest is in (particular types of) expert-witness 
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rulings on the admissibility of testimony—or not—by expert-witnesses 
in which the Court subsequently ruled. 
 
In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court heard 
arguments about a prosecution involving an alleged drug dealer.251 
Specifically, the state presented certificates from an in-state laboratory 
that tested whether the numerous plastic bags containing a white powder 
the defendant allegedly secreted within a police car as he was being 
transported to the station were cocaine.252   
 
The state laboratory tested all the bags from the scene as well as those 
located in the police cruiser.253 At trial, the prosecution introduced the 
bags of cocaine into evidence along with three certificates of analysis 
establishing that the bags tested positive for cocaine.254 Specifically, 
“[t]he certificates reported the weight of the seized bags and stated that 
the bags ‘[h]a[ve] been examined with the following results: The 
substance was found to contain: Cocaine.’”255 Pursuant to 
Massachusetts law, the lab analysts swore before notaries public to the 
findings in the certificates.256   
 
Instead of the laboratory technicians who analyzed whether the 
packages contained cocaine and the amount of narcotics, the 
prosecution simply presented the certificates.257 These certificates were, 
as required by state law, prepared by the State Laboratory of the 
Massachusetts Department of Health.258 The lab technician who 
prepared the certificates did not appear in court, but the certificates were 
sworn to by analysts from the lab in front of a notary public.259 Relying 
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Melendez-Diaz, objected, claiming that the documents were testimonial 
in nature.260 The Court concurred.261   
 
Justice Scalia, writing for a majority that included Justices Stevens, 
Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, concluded that Melendez-Diaz’s 
Confrontation Clause right was violated when he was barred from 
confronting these technicians.262 Addressing the certificates of analysis, 
the Court explained that as they were affidavits, “[t]here is little doubt 
that the documents at issue in this case fall within the ‘core class of 
testimonial statements.’”263 To the state’s argument that the analysts are 
not subject to confrontation, the Court responded that “[t]he Sixth 
Amendment guarantees a defendant ‘the right to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him.’”264 Specifically, the Court explained that 
“Confrontation is one means of assuring accurate forensic analysis . . . 
designed to weed out not only the fraudulent analysis, but the 
incompetent as well.”265 The Court cautioned that “[s]erious 
deficiencies have been found in the forensic evidence used in criminal 
trials.”266  
 
One such situation in Massachusetts became public a few years later. A 
chemist employed in a Massachusetts state drug testing lab, Annie 
Dookhan, had been falsifying drug reports in an attempt to build an 
impressive number of tests she was analyzing.267 In many cases, she 
failed to run analyses that she reported to the courts.268 Dookhan pleaded 
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evidence, and filing false reports.” 269 Ultimately, prosecutors in eight 
Massachusetts counties dismissed charges in over 21,000 drug cases as 
a result.270 
 
After Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court ruled on another case in which 
lab certificates were introduced, but the technician who prepared it did 
not appear in court: Bullcoming v. New Mexico.271 The police arrested 
Donald Bullcoming for DWI after he caused an accident.272 After he 
refused to take a breathalyzer, the police obtained a search warrant to 
obtain a blood sample at a local hospital.273 However, the blood was 
analyzed at a state laboratory.274 At Bullcoming’s trial, the prosecution 
introduced the blood alcohol test results, but the technician who 
conducted the test was unavailable to testify.275 Instead, another lab 
technician who was familiar with the test equipment and procedures 
testified.276 The trial court determined that although the analysis of 
blood-alcohol levels was testimonial, the certifying analyst did not need 
to appear in court; in-court testimony from another analyst from the 
same lab had sufficed to meet the requirements of the Confrontation 
Clause.277 
 
Relying on Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court of New Mexico had 
already ruled that the lab analysis was testimonial. Despite that 
determination, the court concluded that the lab report was nonetheless 
“functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing precisely what 
a witness does on cross-examination.”278 Making clear that testimonial 
is testimonial, the United States Supreme Court was having none of this 
argument: “if an out-of-court statement is testimonial, it may not be 





269 Id.  
270 Id.  
271 564 U.S. 647, 651 (2011). 
272 Id. at 652.   
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274 Id. at 652-53. 
275 Id. at 655. 
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277 Id. at 655-56.   
278 State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1, 8 (N.M. 2008) (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 
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statement is unavailable and the accused has had a prior opportunity to 
confront the witness.”279 In an observation that is important in 
considering evidentiary software, the majority opinion noted that, “[i]n 
any event, the comparative reliability of an analyst’s testimonial report 
does not overcome the Sixth Amendment bar. This Court settled in 
Crawford that the ‘obviou[s] reliab[ility]’ of a testimonial statement 
does not dispense with the Confrontation Clause.”280 
 
At its core, the Confrontation Clause safeguards defendants against 
testimonial hearsay statements.281 The Supreme Court has explained 
that “[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been 
admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the 
defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.”282 
Nonetheless, the Court has hesitated in defining all types of testimonial 
statements.283 Indeed, in assessing whether a statement is testimonial, 
the Supreme Court has explained that “courts should look to all of the 
relevant circumstances.”284 Moreover, in analyzing Crawford, the Court 
noted that the decision “did not offer an exhaustive definition of 
‘testimonial’ statements. Instead, Crawford stated that the label ‘applied 
at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand 
jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.’”285 Such opaque 
standards hardly give courts much guidance.   
 
Legal scholars Jennifer Mnookin and David Kaye have noted that: 
  
[f]or the most part, [lower courts] were reluctant to read 
Crawford as requiring any significant changes to the 
preexisting methods for introducing forensic science 
testimony. In the first years following the Crawford 
decision, most (though certainly not all) trial courts 





279 Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 657. 
280 Id. at 661 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004)). 
281 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
282 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59.   
283 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).   
284 Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 369 (2011).   
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for presenting forensic science testimony into this new 
framework without requiring modifications.286   
 
For example, in the Levine case, the defendant retained a highly 
qualified expert who sought the source code, but the court had 
concluded that, as the government did not have the source code, the 
prosecutor had not committed a Brady violation by failing to provide 
the code to the defendant.287 This reasoning was faulty. At issue was not 
a Brady violation—providing potentially exculpatory evidence in 
possession of the government to the defendant—but rather a failure to 
satisfy the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. 
 
The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that its state law allows 
criminal defendants to cross-examine either the director of the state 
crime laboratory or one of its employees.288 However, this decision 
preceded Melendez-Diaz by about a year, and the state supreme court 
rejected the Confrontation Clause argument because the defendant 
chose not to call any such witness, but instead pled guilty.289 In other 
words, the defendant waived his claim to a Sixth Amendment violation.  
 
In Arizona, state law prevents criminal defendants from challenging the 
admissibility of breathalyzer results. Specifically, the legislature 
mandated that “[t]he inability of any person to obtain manufacturer’s 
schematics and software for a quantitative breath testing device that is 
approved . . . shall not affect the admissibility of the results of a breath 
test.”290 Thus, when Michael Lindner asserted that the failure to require 
the prosecution to provide the source code and a witness to cross-
examine violated the Confrontation Clause, the Arizona Court of 





286 Jennifer Mnookin & David Kaye, Confronting Science: Expert Evidence and the 
Confrontation Clause, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 105.  
287 City of Fargo v. Levine, 747 N.W.2d 130, 132-33 (N.D. 2008).  
288 Id. at 135 (first discussing N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-07(5) (2019); and then discussing 
Berger v. State Highway Comm’r, 394 N.W.2d 678, 686 (N.D. 1986)).   
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only requiring the technician who performed the blood tests as opposed 
to the designer of the equipment used by that technician.291   
 
In Lindner, the appellate court determined that because the officer who 
conducted the breath tests appeared at trial it was not necessary to 
require the breathalyzer’s designer to appear also in order to discuss the 
source code.292 The court concluded that a constitutional violation did 
not occur.293   
 
In West, yet another DWI prosecution, the defendant sought the source 
code for the Intoxilyzer 8000. The 2012 decision by the Oregon Court 
of Appeals rejected this argument, finding that there was “an 
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and to impeach the state’s 
evidence, including the Intoxilyzer test results.” 294 The appellate court 
reasoned that the admission of the Intoxilyzer’s certificates of accuracy 
prepared by technicians, but without their testimony, did not violate the 
Confrontation Clause because these certificates were not testimonial in 
nature.295   
 
In Marino, a 2012 North Carolina case, the defendant asserted he needed 
the source code in order to cross-examine “his primary accuser, the 
Intoximeter.”296 Looking to Melendez-Diaz, the North Carolina Court 
of Appeals explained that the Supreme Court’s decision provided 
defendants with the right to “cross-examine those individuals involved 
in the production of testimonial documents to be introduced at trial, such 
as the technician operating the Intoximeter in the present case,” but held 
that Melendez-Diaz did not provide a basis for the defendants to 
examine the breathalyzer source code.297 This reasoning in West flies in 





291 State v. Lindner, 252 P.3d 1033, 1035-36 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310-11 (2009)). 
292 Id. at 1036.    
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294 State v. West, 279 P.3d 354, 361 (Or. Ct. App. 2012). 
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296 State v. Marino, 747 S.E.2d 633, 638 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013). 
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that not all state technicians can be trusted—as the conviction of Annie 
Dookhan in Massachusetts clearly establishes.298  
 
The situation was different in Minnesota; there, a state court determined 
that source code is essential to safeguarding a defendant’s rights. In 
State v. Underdahl, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that 
defendants who failed to provide any information or documentary 
evidence that the breathalyzer source code was relevant to their criminal 
defense would be denied such source code.299 However, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court further concluded that a defendant who provided 
evidence that “an analysis of the source code may reveal deficiencies 
that could challenge the reliability of the Intoxilyzer” should be entitled 
to engage in discovery regarding that source code.300   
 
Interpreting Underdahl, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota addressed a 
defendant who challenged the revocation of his driver’s license based 
on an implied consent statute and an alcohol concentration in excess of 
the legal limit.301 James Lund submitted an affidavit from a forensic 
scientist who explained the significance of access to the source code for 
the defendant.302 Moreover, the forensic scientist opined that an analysis 





298 The Dookhan scandal is not the only one to rock the criminal justice system leading to the 
overturning of numerous convictions. See generally Keith L. Alexander, Prosecutors Criticize 
D.C. Crime Lab’s Handling of Some DNA Evidence, WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/dc-prosecutors-criticize-city-crime-labs-
handling-of-some-dna-cases/2015/03/05/b5244f88-bea4-11e4-b274-e5209a3bc9a9_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/77Q5-9AGW]; Kyle Swenson, Broward Crime Lab Scandal Could Taint 
Many Cases, MIA. NEW TIMES (Aug. 7, 2014), 
https://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/broward-crime-lab-scandal-could-taint-many-cases-
6396401 [https://perma.cc/CS7U-BJA4]; Mark Hansen, Crime Labs Under the Microscope 
After a String of Shoddy, Suspect and Fraudulent Results, ABA JOURNAL (Sept. 1, 2013), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/crime_labs_under_the_microscope_after_a_strin
g_of_shoddy_suspect_and_fraudu [https://perma.cc/RG6M-36LX]; Maurice Chammah, After 
Drug Lab Scandal, Court Continues to Reverse Conviction, TEX. TRIBUNE (Mar. 27, 2013), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2013/03/27/after-drug-lab-scandal-court-reverses-convictions/ 
[https://perma.cc/R27P-3NHN] (reporting that “a former employee with a DPS crime 
laboratory in Houston may have fabricated the results of thousands of drug tests”). 
299 767 N.W.2d 677, 685 (Minn. 2009). 
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accurately.303 Notwithstanding this expert affidavit, the trial court 
denied the request for discovery of the source code.304 The Lund 
appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that discovery was 
appropriate based on Underdahl because “a showing that discovery of 
the source code is relevant to the accuracy of a petitioner’s test results 
is sufficient to support a motion for discovery of the source code.”305     
 
The Court of Appeals of Minnesota heard similar challenges seeking the 
breathalyzer source code in criminal prosecutions for driving while 
intoxicated. For example, the appellate court reversed and remanded the 
trial court’s decision to deny discovery of the source code when the 
defendant submitted a declaration from a computer forensics expert306 
as well as a complaint filed by Minnesota against the manufacturer of 
the Intoxilyzer.307 Similarly, in State v. Veldhuizen, the Court of Appeals 
of Minnesota concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying a request for discovery of the source code where defendant 
submitted an expert affidavit describing the source code and its effect 
of test results as well as information regarding “two inconsistent data 
reports produced from the same underlying intoxilyzer test.”308   
 
Yet the Court of Appeals of Minnesota affirmed criminal convictions 
for driving while intoxicated when the defendants failed to demonstrate 
before the trial court how the source code would assist them in 
challenging the charge against them: “Cornish did not present a proffer 
or analysis in support of either his pretrial motion to compel or his 
timely motion for a new trial that is comparable to the submission found 
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305 Id. at *3; see also Duncan v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, No. A08-2237, 2009 WL 2366280, at 
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proffers were insufficient to establish that the source code would be 
useful in challenging the breathalyzer evidence.310 
 
Similarly, in State v. Garberg, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota heard 
another appeal challenging the denial of access to a breathalyzer source 
code.311 The court determined that the defendant “failed to make a 
threshold evidentiary showing that the source code information may 
relate to his guilt or innocence, negate his guilt, or reduce his 
culpability” before the trial court as mandated in Underdahl.312 This 
inconsistency is troubling. As we have shown, the problem of buggy 
(and hence unreliable) code is endemic in computer software; one 
cannot assume, absent substantial evidence, that some particular piece 
of software is correct. 
 
The issue of correct software occurs in a myriad of different situations, 
including in situations of far greater import than an individual DWI 
case. For example, recently, the federal government engaged in a 
nationwide prosecution of individuals who distributed child 
pornography images amongst themselves on a secured website known 
as Playpen.313 Criminal defendants around the country had varying 
degrees of success in challenging the evidence used against them.314   
 
In 2016, in United States v. Michaud, the federal government indicted 
Jay Michaud for offenses related to child pornography.315 Defense 
counsel moved for the prosecution to produce the source code for the 
network investigative technique (“NIT”) used by the FBI during its 
investigation.316 The technique was designed to activate a “computer—
wherever located—to send to a computer controlled by or known to the 
government, network level messages containing information that may 
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313 See generally Brian L. Owsley, Network Investigative Source Code and Due Process, 14 
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information.”317 The district court concluded that it would be prejudicial 
to the defendant if the government were allowed to enter evidence to 
which the defendant could not meaningfully respond because of lack of 
access to the NIT source code.318 The court further explained given that 
“the discovery withheld implicates the defendant’s constitutional 
rights,”319 any “evidence of the NIT and the search warrant issued on 
the basis of the NIT should be suppressed, and the fruits of that search 
must also be suppressed.”320   
 
The prosecution then moved to dismiss the charges against Michaud 
without prejudice,321 resulting in the dismissal of the charges against 
him.322 However, Michaud was an exception; most defendants caught 
through the Playpen investigation failed to gain access to the source 
code despite filing motions to do so.323   
 
Most recently, in a prosecution reliant upon DNA software for 
identification, the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division 
considered whether the Confrontation Clause required the prosecution 
to provide the defendant with source code.324 Law enforcement had 
located DNA on the cord used to strangle the decedent.325 After the 
defendant’s arrest, the police took a buccal swab to gather his DNA for 
testing using a software program known as TrueAllele Casework 
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Confrontation Clause right by denying him access to TrueAllele’s 
source code.327   
 
The appellate court characterized the argument by the defendant, 
Wakefield, as novel because it was based on the source code being the 
out-of-court declarant.328 Moreover, it determined that “the TrueAllele 
report [was] testimonial in nature.”329 Nonetheless, the court rejected 
the argument that the source code should be available to the defendant 
because the creator of TrueAllele who wrote its source code had testified 
about the pertinent algorithm.330 In the court’s opinion, there was no 
violation of Wakefield’s Confrontation Clause right.331 Having the 
algorithm’s designer testify about the code did not answer, however, 
whether the software performed correctly; only an examination of the 
code could do that. 
 
The decision in Wakefield, along with Michaud, Underdahl, and its 
progeny, demonstrates that on a case-by-case basis, some courts are 
starting to acknowledge that source code may be essential for 
defendants to exercise their Confrontation Clause rights. These cases, 
however, have largely not addressed the issue of correctness of 
evidentiary software. 
 
2. Implications for Evidentiary Software 
 
The limited Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in this area has 
developed based on the determination that criminal defendants do not 
really need access to the source code—and thus their constitutional 
rights are not violated when they lack this ability. As Jennifer Mnookin 
explained:  
 
[A] great many lower court opinions have wrestled with 
the potential Confrontation Clause implications of expert 
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as testimonial. Most of these courts have endeavored to 
find ways around Crawford's dictates; unfortunately, 
most of the arguments proffered by these courts are 
deeply intellectually unsatisfying.332 
 
The previously discussed Intoxilyzer decisions further demonstrate that 
point.333 
 
Since Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, courts have wrestled with 
appropriately handling the Confrontation Clause when the expert 
witness is not a person but rather a result determined by computer 
software. As Professor Mnookin indicated, the key issue in Crawford is, 
“[w]as the statement made in circumstances that suggest its likely future 
relevance as testimony in a criminal prosecution?”334 For evidentiary 
software, the answer is an unqualified yes. Its purpose is exactly to 
produce testimony to be relied upon in a criminal trial. The expert is not 
the policeman proffering the results of a breathalyzer test or a radar gun; 
the expert is the reasoning exemplified in the software that processes the 
data—and the implementation of that reasoning. In this regard, 
Wakefield reached exactly wrong conclusion.   
 
To get it right, we need to go back to Daubert, which lays out very 
clearly how to determine the admissibility of expert witness testimony:  
 
The Rules—especially Rule 702—place appropriate 
limits on the admissibility of purportedly scientific 
evidence by assigning to the trial judge the task of 
ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a 





332 Mnookin, supra note 248, at 796. 
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[T]he trial judge, pursuant to Rule 104(a), must make a 
preliminary assessment of whether the testimony’s 
underlying reasoning or methodology is scientifically 
valid . . . .335 
 
The Supreme Court’s analysis in Daubert warrants repeating: the trial 
judge is assigned the task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony rests on 
a reliable foundation and must make a preliminary assessment of 
whether the testimony’s underlying reasoning is scientifically valid.336 
As we already have documented, despite the best intentions of 
programmers, source code often has errors. Yet there is no way for a 
defendant to demonstrate the existence of any errors without having the 
code examined. Therefore, any approach that eschews access to the code 
for such an examination presents a serious gap in the protection of 
defendants’ rights.   
 
A trial judge is not in a position to determine whether the underlying 
reasoning provided by the program is valid or whether, if the underlying 
reasoning is correct, it has been properly implemented. Indeed, when it 
comes to technological developments that impact a criminal defendant’s 
constitutional rights, many judges are ill-equipped to analyze the 
nuances related to such technology.337 This realization begs the question 
of how best to address this issue and safeguard constitutional rights. 
 
We do not live in a perfect world where there are no criminals, where 
the criminals that exist conduct only minor criminal activities that cause 
no serious, long-term harm, where all computer code works perfectly 
the first time, or where software errors are easy to find. Consequently, 





335 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 579-80 (1993). 
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337 See, e.g., Brian L. Owsley, Triggerfish, Stingrays, and Fourth Amendment Fishing 
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denying use of a cell site simulator.”); Brian L. Owsley, The Fourth Amendment Implications 
of the Government’s Use of Cell Tower Dumps, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 18 (2013) (“[I]n my 
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convictions based on faulty software. However, we do have a solution 
posed by evidentiary software that can level the playing field and enable 
defendants “to confront the witnesses against [them].”338 It is a solution 
that lies already in the words of Melendez-Diaz, where the Court 
enunciated that “[c]onfrontation is designed to weed out not only the 
fraudulent analyst, but the incompetent one as well.”339  
 
In one regard, Crawford’s purpose was rooting out hearsay (“even if the 
Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned with testimonial hearsay, that 
is its primary object, and interrogations by law enforcement officers fall 
squarely within that class”340) but in essence, the courts relying on 
source code that the defendant cannot cross examine is analogous to the 
courts relying on hearsay. In analyzing hearsay, Mnookin wrote that, 
post-Crawford, it is not acceptable to simply cross examine an expert 
witness if she herself has relied on hearsay; the defendant must be also 
be afforded the opportunity to cross examine those upon whom the 
expert relied in preparing her testimony.341 
 
One might imagine an objection to this two-prong approach posited by 
Mnookin on the grounds that this process can lead to an almost infinite 
regression of required witnesses, each one suggesting that they have 
learned some small fact relevant to the case from the next, who must 
then be called to testify.342 Mnookin and Kaye call into question that 
only the expert needs to be available and questioned as a witness by 
defense counsel: 
 
Take the testimony about the chemical makeup of a drug 
in Melendez-Diaz. Justice Scalia implies that the person 
who establishes the accuracy of the testing device is not 
required. But why not? Is that not a prerequisite to being 
able to be confident about the accuracy of the result? 
Arguably the person who interpreted the result is making 





338 Levine, 747 N.W.2d at 134. 
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341 Mnookin, supra note 248, at 832-33. 
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defendant. Is this individual therefore the only one who 
needs to testify? What if the technician who prepared the 
sample somehow contaminated it? Should that 
technician be required to testify as well? None of these 
technicians is merely engaged in documenting a chain of 
custody. They are all taking steps that contribute to the 
final conclusion about the chemical composition of the 
substance at issue.343 
 
However, the issue they raise (which they also answer) is not of concern 
here: the “witness” is only one deep. It is the software upon which the 
expert witness relied in order to provide her testimony. 
 
The issue of hearsay is exactly the point here. The expert witness 
testifying about the results of a breathalyzer or DNA test is not testifying 
as to what the software does. Instead, that expert is testifying as to what 
the program designer and coder intended the software to do. Nor, for the 
same reason, is it adequate for the program designer or coder to testify—
for they know only what they intended the software to do, not that the 
program does exactly that, no more, no less, in all circumstances. The 
harm that Crawford seeks to prevent—the inability of the defendant to 
confront a witness testifying against him—is denied when he, or his 
delegated authorities, cannot examine the code. Only by viewing the 
code can the defendant have the rights afforded to him by the 
Confrontation Clause. Given the prevalence of errors in software, 
defendants must have that right.  
 
We propose a simple test (analogous by voting system software 
independence) for determining whether software-based systems that 
produce criminal evidence should be subject to adversarial analysis. If 
the relevant inputs to the system are retained, and all other information 
and algorithms required to reproduce the software-based evidence are 
available to opposing parties, then there is likely no compelling benefit 
to adversarial analysis of the software. In such cases, the correctness of 
the software’s behavior can be confirmed or refuted simply by 
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comparing the result with the evidence in question. If, on the other hand, 
such an independent recalculation cannot be done (either because some 
relevant inputs are not available or because the software relies on 
proprietary algorithms or other behavior), there is no way for an 
opposing party to determine whether the evidence is correct without 
expert adversarial analysis of the software. Such a test has the benefit of 
being relatively straightforward to apply by courts.  
 
We must admit that our proposed solution is not quite as simple as those 
words might make it appear. Evidentiary code is typically developed by 
the private sector with the intent of profit. In other words, making the 
underlying code public is implausible. However, there are many ways 
for the software to be examined by the defense that do not require the 
code to accessible to the general public. The most obvious answer is a 
protective order, similar to those used in patent cases, be used in regard 
to source code. This approach was considered in Peters, but 
unfortunately for the criminal defendant the expert refused to sign the 
proposed protective order, resulting in an adverse decision for the 
criminal defendant.344 Provisions of such orders commonly include 
requirements that analysis be done on computers not connected to the 
Internet, and that the analysts not have any means, e.g., external disks, 
with which they can make copies of the software at issue.345 Other 
mechanisms, including limited courtroom closures, are discussed by 
Wexler.346   
 
C. Due Process Clause  
 
The Fifth Amendment mandates that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”347 Similarly, 
the Fourteenth Amendment serves as a constraint on action by states: 





344 State v. Peters, 264 P.3d 1124, 1129, 1131 (Mont. 2011).    
345 Lydia Pallas Loren & Andy Johnson-Laird, Computer Software-Related Litigation: 
Discovery and the Overly-Protective Order, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 75, 99-100 (2012). 
346 Wexler, supra note 11, at 1409-10. 
347 U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
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without due process of law.”348 Due process is not easily defined, but at 
its core, the right of due process is about fundamental fairness.349   
 
Courts have rejected criminal defendants’ due process claims for source 
code when the government does not have the source code.350 “Due 
process does not require the police to seek and find exculpatory 
evidence.”351 The increased move by society to outsourcing services 
might well lead to a situation in which law enforcement increasingly 
does not actually have the software that was used in the conviction.352 
Thus, any requirement that a defendant has the right to examine 
software might need to be addressed not only judicially, but also 
legislatively.  
 
While courts might be not be willing to compel discovery of the source 
code in civil proceedings, such as driver’s license revocation hearings, 
discovery might be warranted in criminal proceedings.353 In Crandall, 
the court indicated that due process was not an issue because it was a 
summary civil proceeding, but “[d]iscovery of the source code might be 
permitted for [a] criminal trial.”354 In the civil context, legislative 
solutions may be the only way for individuals to obtain this necessary 
information. Nonetheless, courts have a role in determining whether due 
process was violated. In the end, there is a fundamental unfairness for 
the government to rely on a technology and prevent a defendant from 
challenging its reliability when addressing the adverse consequences. 
Ultimately, courts have a role in determining whether a due process 






348 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
349 See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981); see also State v. 
Davis, 898 N.E.2d 281, 287 (Ind. 2008).   
350 See Mahan v. Bunting, No. 1:13-CV-00165, 2014 WL 1154054, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 20, 
2014). 
351 Id. (quoting Stadler v. Curtin, 682 F. Supp. 2d 807, 818 (E.D. Mich. 2010)).   
352 See, e.g., City of Fargo v. Levine, 747 N.W.2d 130, 133-34 (N.D. 2008). 
353 See In re Crandall, No. 2008–951, 2008 WL 4615633, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 25, 2008), 
aff’d sub nom. Crandall v. Brovetto, 891 N.Y.S.2d 761 (2010). 
354 Id.  
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Machines based on software are susceptible to potential errors that lead 
to testimony that can wrongly convict individuals.355 Without allowing 
defendants to have access to the source code related to their cases, they 
will be unable to have experts who can analyze whether the source code 
operates as it is intended to do or whether there are flaws that might lead 
to the conviction of an innocent defendant. Indeed, in 2008, in State v. 
Kummer, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota explained that failing to 
provide a defendant the source code for the Intoxilyzer 5000EN might 
violate her due process rights.356   
 
Notwithstanding the Kummer court’s decision, courts generally do not 
address the merits of whether the denial of access to source code for 
criminal defendants violates due process. Some reasons make sense. For 
example, in 2010, another Minnesota appellate court declined to address 
a due process violation based on the use of a breathalyzer when the 
defendant was convicted for driving under the influence based on a urine 
sample as opposed to the use of a breathalyzer.357 Indeed, appellate 
courts regularly decline to address the issue because defendants raised 
it for the first time on appeal.358 
 
In Peters, criminal defendants also asserted a claim based on a due 
process violation regarding convictions for driving under the 
influence.359 In 2011, the Supreme Court of Montana declined to 
address the due process claim.360 The court determined that CMI had 
offered to make the source code available to the defendants, but the 





355 Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, 1989-90 (2017).   
356 No. A08-0533, 2008 WL 4472610, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2008). 
357 State v. Sterling, 782 N.W.2d 579, 581 n.2 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010).   
358 See Christian v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, No. A13-1921, 2014 WL 1758374, at *2 (Minn. 
Ct. App. May 5, 2014); State v. Garberg, No. A09-914, 2010 WL 772622, at *3 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Mar. 9, 2010); Lund v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, No. A08-1408, 2009 WL 1587135, at *3 
(Minn. Ct. App. June 9, 2009); see also State v. Lindner, No. 1 CA-CR 09-0583, 2010 WL 
2103532 at *1 (Ariz Ct. App. May 25, 2010) (Lindner “waived these claims . . . by failing to 
argue them” in his appellate brief) (citations omitted), superseded by 252 P.3d 1033 (Ariz Ct. 
App. 2010).   
359 State v. Peters, 264 P.3d 1124, 1129, 1132 (Mont. 2011).  
360 Id. at 1132 (“Courts should avoid constitutional questions whenever possible.” (citing 
Kulstad v. Maniaci, 244 P.3d 722 (Mont. 2010))). 
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terms.361 Specifically, he expressed concerns that he could be 
sanctioned and lose his law license based on the overly strict approach 
by CMI in its take-it-or-leave-it agreement.362 Moreover, CMI expected 
the expert to work exclusively at its headquarters and to destroy his 
computer hard drive when the review was completed.363 These demands 
by CMI also served to create a much more burdensome and costly 
review process.   
 
In that context, the Peters court found that it was not necessary to review 
the due process claims.364 However, this determination ignored the fact 
that it left the criminal defendants without any means to present a 
defense to the charges against them.   
 
In West, the criminal defendant was indigent and sought state funds so 
that he could retain an expert to analyze the breathalyzer’s source 
code.365 After the trial court denied his request for such funds, West 
argued that this denial violated his due process rights.366 Specifically, 
he asserted that the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the 
breathalyzer was reliable and that an expert to analyze the source code 
would assist him in obtaining exculpatory evidence.367 In 2012, the 
Court of Appeals of Oregon rejected the due process argument, 
concluding that it constituted a fishing expedition.368 It noted that West 
“relies instead on the assertion that, if various governmental agencies 
produced everything defendant requested . . . then an expert might be 
able to demonstrate that the documents reveal something useful.”369 
This approach did not establish a basis for finding a due process 







362 Id. at 1129.   
363 Id.  
364 Id. at 1132. 
365 State v. West, 279 P.3d 354, 360 (Or. Ct. App. 2012). 
366 Id.  
367 Id.  
368 Id.   
369 Id. 
370 Id. at 361. 
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In Collins v. State, the defendant was charged with DUI per se and DUI 
less safe, but the trial court only sentenced her based on a conviction for 
DUI less safe.371 On appeal, she argued that her due process rights were 
violated because she was not able to access the source code for the 
Intoxilyzer 5000 for trial.372 In 2014, the Court of Appeals of Georgia 
concluded that Collins’ due process claim was moot because she was 
only convicted of DUI less safe, which was unrelated to the source 
code.373    
 
In Commonwealth v. Camblin, the defendant challenged the denial 
pursuant to state and federal due process rights.374 In 2015, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which is the state’s highest 
court, addressed the trial court’s decision denying a motion in limine 
seeking to bar the breath test machine because it was scientifically 
unreliable.375 Due process mandates that evidence presented by the 
prosecution must be reliable.376 The court reversed, finding that the 
defendant was addressing a new technology and thus should have be 








371 760 S.E.2d 606, 608 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-
391(a)(5) (2014) (establishing six ways in which a driver may be driving while impaired in 
some manner.) The statute defines DUI per se as “driv[ing] or be[ing] in actual physical 
control of any moving vehicle while . . . [t]he person’s alcohol concentration is 0.08 grams or 
more at any time within three hours after such driving or being in actual physical control from 
alcohol consumed before such driving or being in actual physical control ended.” Id. In other 
words, this definition fits the standard blood alcohol concentration. The statute also defines 
DUI less safe as “driv[ing] or be[ing] in actual physical control of any moving vehicle while . . 
. [u]nder the influence of alcohol to the extent that it is less safe for the person to drive.” Id. § 
40-6-391(a)(1). In order to meet this standard, it is not necessary to provide evidence of blood 
alcohol concentration. Instead, the prosecution simply needs to establish an impairment due to 
alcohol based on circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 687 S.E.2d 854, 858 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2009).   
372 Collins, 760 S.E.2d at 608. 
373 Id. at 608-09.   
374 31 N.E.3d 1102, 1108 (Mass. 2015). 
375 Id. at 1104-05.   
376 Id. at 1111 (discussing Commonwealth v. Given, 808 N.E.2d 788 (Mass. 2004)).   
377 Id. at 1112.   
2021]  71 
 
 
IV. Conclusion  
 
As the above legal discussion reflects, there are not many cases 
addressing a defendant’s right to access of the relevant source code 
consistent with a constitutional right. In most of the breathalyzer cases, 
the defendants and their attorneys failed to properly present the various 
constitutional challenges such that there were very few discussions on 
the merits. Even in the few instances of decisions on the merits, the 
courts fail to understand the implications of the requests. For example, 
in Camblin, the court granted the request because it was a new 
technology; that, though, is not the fundamental issue. 
 
Overall, the problem is that the courts have applied the wrong standard. 
This is exemplified by the Minnesota ruling in Garberg, where the court 
wrote that the defendant “failed to make a threshold evidentiary 
showing that the source code information may relate to his guilt or 
innocence, negate his guilt, or reduce his culpability.”378 In other words, 
the court felt that software should be presumed reliable, and that without 
specific indications to the contrary Garberg could not have access to the 
source code. This is in stark contrast to how human witnesses are 
treated, where defendants have a constitutional right to try to impeach 
their credibility. Software does not deserve elevated status. Defendants 
must have access to evidentiary source code. 
 
Implementing this policy requires several modifications to current 
practice. First, of course, is a rule on when defendants should have such 
access. We suggest adapting the definition of “software independence” 
proposed by Professor Rivest for elections: “A voting system is 
software-independent if an undetected change or error in its software 
cannot cause an undetectable change or error in an election outcome.”379 
Note carefully that this does not rule out the use of software; systems 
where software proposes an answer but a manual process verifies it can 





378 State v. Garberg, No. A09-914, 2010 WL 772622, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2010). 
379 Rivest & Wack, supra note 164, at 3761. 
380 In election systems, this can be accomplished by risk-limiting audits, a statistical process 
that involves manual counting of a small subset of the ballots cast, even if they were tallied by 
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analogously “software-independent”, the defense should be entitled to 
examine the software that produced it. 
 
A second crucial point is that the source code must be available for 
production by the prosecution. Procurement contracts must specify 
delivery of source code for each version of the code or device. This has 
to be part of acceptance of the product by the government, with no 
payment tendered or use of the product until the source code has been 
delivered. Such a policy would avoid situations as in In re 
Commissioner of Public Safety, where the Commissioner had to be 
ordered to obtain the code,381 or Bonakoske, where the vendor asserted 
that it no longer possessed the code.382 
 
Finally, defendants must have reasonable access. Auditing a program is 
not done simply by staring at printouts of the code; rather, a variety of 
specialized tools are used, both to examine the code383 and to do test 
executions.384 Audits may require teams; furthermore, it must often be 
contracted out to specialist companies. Reasonable protective orders 
may be required,385 but they should not be overly onerous, as in 
Peters.386 Even these may not be enough. As we noted, training data 
must be provided if machine learning algorithms are involved.387 
Professor Bratus et al. suggest the need for information on external 
inputs, e.g., the time of day, the configuration of the operating system 
and supporting software, and the specific version of the evidentiary 





a computer. See, e.g., Mark Lindeman & Philip B. Stark, A Gentle Introduction to Risk-
limiting Audits, 10 IEEE SEC. & PRIV. 42, 42 (2012). 
381 735 N.W.2d 706, 709 (Minn. 2007) (The Commissioner had to be ordered to “obtain and 
provide to [Underdahl’s] counsel the complete computer source code.”) (emphasis added). 
382 Affidavit of Brian Faulkner at ¶ 5, State v. Bonakoske (Fla. Charlotte County Ct. June 10, 
2011) (No. 08-1726-T).  
383 A simple example of such a tool is one that finds each location where each variable is used. 
384 One well-known technique for finding bugs at runtime is known as “fuzzing.” See, e.g., 
Andy Greenberg, Hacker Lexicon: What is Fuzzing?, WIRED (June 2, 2016), 
https://www.wired.com/2016/06/hacker-lexicon-fuzzing/ [https://perma.cc/4L2N-D786]. 
385 But see Wexler, supra note 11. 
386 State v. Peters, 264 P.3d. 1124 (Mont. 2011). 
387 See Vincent, supra note 178. 
388 Sergey Bratus et al., Software on the Witness Stand: What Should It Take for Us to Trust 
It?, in TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHY COMPUTING 396, 406 (Alessandro Acquisti et al. eds., 2010). 




Arguably, providing access to source code will impose a burden on the 
prosecution. Many defendants will be economically unable to take 
advantage of such opportunities. But neither consideration is unique. 
 
From a technical perspective, it is a virtual certainty that any significant 
software system contains bugs. As Christian Chessman wrote, “[i]t is 
difficult to overstate the fallibility of computer programs.”389 
 
As shown in Chun and Foley, breathalyzers and DNA-matching devices 
are not immune.390 These bugs may or may not affect the results in any 
given case, but in our judicial system, the Constitution and fundamental 
considerations of due process demand that defendants should have the 







389 Christian Chessman, A “Source” of Error: Computer Code, Criminal Defendants, and the 
Constitution, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 179, 228 (2017). 
390 State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 126-31 (N.J. 2008); Commonwealth v. Foley, 38 A.3d 882, 
887 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). 
